LUMEN FLUENS · COMPARATIVE STUDY VII

LUMEN FLUENS AND HEGEL

Where we meet, where we part — Comparative Study VII

ENGLISH EDITION · TRANSLATED FROM THE PORTUGUESE ORIGINAL, VERSION 1.1

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Genre: Comparative Study · Level: advanced · Part of the canon: the whole canon, in external dialogue — in particular Flumen, Mutatio, Lux, the Vigil and the Common Waters

Principle of the series — To compare is not to compete. Each study honors the doctrine it visits by presenting it in its best form, and only then draws the borders. A philosophy that needs to diminish others in order to exist does not trust its own light.

Prologue — The state of the question and the method

The six previous studies visited doctrines of life: paths that prescribe a practice and promise a wisdom. Hegel is not that. He does not teach how to sit, how to breathe or how to pray; he has no rule of life. He is the philosopher of process — the thinker for whom truth lies at no single point but in the whole journey, and for whom history is not the stage on which spirit appears but the very way in which spirit exists. Why, then, bring him into the series?

Because Lumen Fluens, read from outside, looks Hegelian. A river running through generations and civilizations; change raised to a vocation; an eternal that "dances in time"; a doctrine that grows through the objections it takes seriously and incorporates what contradicted it — all of this has the profile of a philosophy of history and becoming. A reader trained in Hegel could rightly ask whether the canon is not a Hegelianism that ignores its own name. The question deserves an answer, and the answer is no. But the no only becomes clear when one says exactly where Hegel enters — because it is at the border of what he cannot enter that the canon shows its backbone.

The short answer, which the whole study unfolds: Hegel enters through the river and through the method, and knocks on two closed doors, that of the light and that of the night. He enters through the river, because no one carried the evidence of the Flumen as far as he did, the evidence that we are heirs and ancestors. He enters through the method, because the doctrine of Lumen Fluens grew, in the passage from the first version of the canon to version 1.2, exactly as Hegel describes the growth of a truth: through an objection taken seriously, which said what was missing. He knocks at the door of the light, because for him the worth of the person becomes actual only when it is known and formed, and for the canon the light is given before any journey and is only revealed. And he knocks at the door of the night, because he reconciles the thinking spirit with evil, and the Vigil does not reconcile: it keeps watch. The study proposes a formula, and the founder decides whether to adopt it: Lumen Fluens accepts dialectic as a method of doctrinal growth and refuses it as theodicy.

How to read this study

Three voices run through the text and remain separate. **Hegel says** what is in his texts, quoted and located: the *Phenomenology of Spirit* by Miller's paragraph numbering, the *Philosophy of Right* by its

paragraphs, the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia* by book and paragraph, the *Lectures* by part and edition. **The tradition reads** what a named interpreter makes of the text: Kojève, Taylor, Pinkard, Honneth, Kierkegaard, Adorno. **The canon answers** with the words of Canon VI.2, of the Treatise on the Inner Light or of the Disputatio on evil, always by the name of the element: Lux, Flumen, the Compass, the Shelter, the Vigil, the Common Waters. What goes beyond these three voices belongs to the study, and is marked as such: [the study's reading], [the study's inference], [the study's hypothesis]. The study proposes; it does not decide. Only the founder alters the doctrine.

The quotations carry verification markers. A quotation without a marker was checked against the original; [V-en], [V-es] and [V-pt] say that the page checked is from an English, Spanish or Portuguese translation; [V via secondary source] says that the text was read through another author; [paraphrase] says that the sense is faithful but the words are not the author's; [location to be confirmed] and [page to be confirmed] say what remains to be checked. We prefer a marked gap to a false quotation. The translations from the German are working translations, made for this study, and remain to be checked against the Brazilian reference editions; the first occurrence in each chapter carries [the study's translation]. Hegel's lectures and Additions are posthumous compilations, of lesser authority than the works he published, and the text says so whenever it cites them.

The study follows the rule of the series: to compare is not to compete. Hegel is presented first in his best form, from the texts and in no hurry to object (chapter 1); only then does the study look for where the canon already walks at his side (chapter 2) and where it parts from him (chapter 3). Hegel knew five of the six houses the series has already visited, and chapter 4 hears what he said of each, what modern criticism corrects and how that helps or hinders the canon in seeing them. Chapter 5 opens the doors that the reading of Hegel opens: seven authors the series has not yet visited, in outline. Chapter 6 gathers the synthesis, the formula and the twelve questions the study leaves open. There follow the sources by chapter, the bibliography and the verification panel.

What changed since the first version

This study replaces a short version, from October 2026, written by a single hand and without research into sources. The research corrected it at points that ought to be declared, because honesty is the method. The sentence about the "path of despair" is from paragraph 78 of the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, not from 80; the thesis on the fall is in the third Addition to §24 of the *Encyclopaedia*, not in the second. The *Schlachtbank* is a slaughter-bench, a slaughterhouse; there is no butcher in the text. The formula "thesis, antithesis, synthesis" is not Hegel's, and *Aufheben* has, in his own words, two senses, to preserve and to make cease; "raising" is the interpreters' gloss. The sentence at §669 — "the wounds of the spirit heal, and leave no scars behind" — concerns guilt and forgiveness between moral agents and is not a word about victims or about the evil no one caused; the first version used it against the Vigil, and that displaced its scope. Hegel's theodicy reconciles

the thinking spirit with evil; the first version said that "the sacrifice is redeemed by the result", and the text does not say that much: the exact criticism is that the victim is not counted. The "world's court of judgment" judges peoples, not the individual case, and Hegel denies that it is the mere verdict of might. "Person" has two registers in Hegel, and is not merely the poorest determination of spirit. The border with the Lux does not run between having worth and lacking it — Hegel affirms the infinite worth of man —, but between actual and known worth and revealed worth. And the first version attributed to Hegel a demand to "translate" the Antiphon into concept that he never formulated; the study withdraws it. What the first version got right — the river, the method, the Vigil against theodicy — is here, with the sources it lacked.

The founder's decisions (version 1.1, 17 October 2026)

The founder read version 1.0 of this study and answered what it asked him. The decisions below stand as his word, not the study's. The body of the text keeps the form in which the questions were put, as a history of the method, and refers to this section at the places where it put them.

1. **The formula** (6.2) is adopted: Lumen Fluens accepts dialectic as a method of doctrinal growth and refuses it as theodicy.
2. **The second question of the series** (6.2) is adopted, with its answer. Alongside "what lies at the bottom of the person?", the series asks "what lies at the bottom of the night?" — and Lumen Fluens answers: a light lit inside the night, which does not need the end in order to be worth something.
3. **Question (a)**: the Lux comes before the Shelter. The light is given before any relation; the gaze of the other does not manufacture it, but may be the first to see it — the Shelter can reveal a hidden light.
4. **Question (b)**: the hand that takes back, in the Rule of Mercy, is the river — the Flumen —, not the Shelter. Being taken back is belonging, and does not depend on another person.
5. **Question (c)**: the image of the wolf can bear thoughtlessness. The wolf is whoever inflicts evil, with or without intent; thoughtlessness is not night.
6. **Question (d)**: the lexicon of light and temple is kept. Adorno's objection is recorded as heard; the Vigil does not promise what he refuses — meaning or redemption of pain.
7. **Vocabulary**: the name of Pillar III is feminine in the Latin — *a* Mutatio, like *a* Lux.

Questions (e) to (l) remain open, in the terms of 6.3. None of the decisions alters the text of Canon v1.2: they fix how the canon is to be read at the points where the study asked.

1. Hegel in his best form

This chapter sets out Hegel as he would ask to be read: through the texts, in the order in which the thought moves, with no haste to object. The comparison with the canon will come in chapters 2 and 3. The study's three voices apply: *Hegel says*, when a passage is quoted and located; *the tradition reads*, when a named interpreter gives meaning to the text; the canon will be heard only in the last section, to indicate where it will speak, save for a vocabulary notice in 1.5. Additions (*Zusätze*) and lectures (*Vorlesungen*) are posthumous compilations, of lesser authority, and will be indicated. The translations into Portuguese are working translations and are marked for checking against the Brazilian editions (see the Sources at the end of the chapter).

1.1 A system in a circle

Hegel calls the unity of thinking with the real the Idea, and expounds it in three sciences. In the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (§18), the Idea is thinking identical with itself and, at the same time, the activity of setting itself over against itself, "in order to be for itself", and of being, in that other, "only at home with itself" [the study's translation]. Logic considers it in and for itself: the forms of pure thinking, from being to essence and to the concept. Nature is the Idea in its being-other; §244 says that it releases itself, freely, "as nature". Spirit is the Idea that returns to itself from this being-other (§385). It unfolds in three: subjective spirit, the singular human being with soul, consciousness and will; objective spirit, which gathers right, morality, ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*: freedom already become custom and institution, in the family, civil society and the state) and world history; and absolute spirit, in which spirit knows itself through art, which is intuition, through religion, which is representation — thinking in images and narratives —, and through philosophy, which is concept — the same content, thought as thought.

The order is one of concept, not of time: "for us, spirit has nature as its presupposition; it is the truth of nature and, with that, the absolutely first" (§381). What is last in the exposition is first in truth. Hence the circle, the image that the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (§§17–18) gives of the True: "the circle that presupposes its end as its purpose and has it as its beginning". The *Phenomenology* (1807) stands apart: it is the path that leads ordinary consciousness to the standpoint of science.

1.2 Three sides and a negation that determines

Hegel does not teach dialectic in three steps. The *Encyclopaedia* (§79) says that the logical has, as to form, three sides: the abstract or of the understanding, the dialectical or negatively rational, the speculative or positively rational. They are sides of every concept, not stages of a journey, and the speculative, writes §82, "grasps the unity of determinations in their opposition". The formula

"thesis–antithesis–synthesis", which is usually attributed to Hegel, is not in these pages: it comes from Chalybäus (1837) [secondary source; location to be confirmed].

What moves thought is determinate negation. The Introduction to the *Phenomenology* says (§79): "When, on the contrary, the result is grasped as it is in truth, as determinate negation, a new form immediately arises." Skepticism sees in the result only the empty nothing; for Hegel the nothing is always the nothing *of something*, and for that reason it has content and generates the next step. Hence the *Phenomenology* can be seen as "the path of doubt, or, more properly, as the path of despair" (§78): consciousness loses, figure after figure, what it took to be real, and Hegel reads this loss as the realization of the concept. In the Logic, the beginning is "Being, pure being — without any further determination", indistinct from pure nothing: "Its truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming" (Book I, ch. 1).

1.3 The double meaning of *Aufheben*

Aufheben, the verb in which dialectic is summed up, has two declared meanings. The word serves at once to keep a thing and to set it aside. The bud that ceases in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and that the blossom nevertheless keeps (see 1.4), is the simplest example. In the *Science of Logic* (Book I, ch. 1, Remark), Hegel writes that the word has, in the language, "the double meaning of preserving, maintaining, and at the same time of making cease, putting an end". The third term that is usually added, "raising", is the interpreters' addition: Hegel speaks of lifting only when recalling the Latin *tollere*, whose double meaning, he says, "does not go so far; the affirmative determination goes only as far as lifting (*Emporheben*)". The formula "negate–preserve–raise" belongs to the tradition. In Portuguese, translators render the word as "suprassumir" or "superar" [location to be confirmed].

1.4 The whole, the subject, the result

The Preface to the *Phenomenology* gives the system its watchword. Everything depends, says Hegel (§§17–18), on "grasping and expressing the True not only as substance, but equally as subject". The Absolute is not an immobile thing; it is "the becoming of itself", and "subject" names this movement, not the singular human being who thinks. Hence the emblematic sentence: "The True is the whole. But the whole is only the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it is in truth" (§20).

Its reach must be gauged. The sentence speaks of the Absolute as process, whose beginning is only the universal; it does not say, by itself, that a person's worth is won. And it comes with a demand for seriousness: according to Hegel, the idea declines into edification — the discourse that consoles without having walked the path — "when it lacks the seriousness, the pain, the patience and the

labor of the negative" (§19) [paraphrase]. For this reason, §39 states, "truth is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made".

The image of development is in §2, on the subject of rival systems: "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom [...]. But their fluid nature makes them, at the same time, moments of the organic unity, in which they not only do not contradict one another, but one is as necessary as the other." What looks like refutation is the development of truth. The tradition is divided over the subject of this development: for Charles Taylor, spirit is a metaphysical reality; for Terry Pinkard, whose book states its thesis in the subtitle, the sociality of reason, it is a social reality; for Robert Pippin, the reading is post-Kantian. This study keeps to the text.

1.5 From recognition to the beyond

The *Phenomenology* recounts the formation of consciousness, and one of its decisive knots is recognition. Hegel writes (§178) that self-consciousness "is in and for itself insofar as, and because, it is in and for itself for an other; that is, it is only as something recognized". It does not exist beforehand in order to be recognized afterwards: it is in recognition. §179 already carries the germ of the formula of freedom to come (see 1.8), for self-consciousness sees "itself in the other". Alexandre Kojève, in an influential and contested reading, makes the desire for recognition the engine of history; Jean Hyppolite, his counterweight, is useful above all for the unhappy consciousness and the beautiful soul.

In the life-and-death struggle that opens the encounter, whoever shrinks from the risk — "the individual who has not risked his life", says Hegel (§§187–188) — "may, to be sure, be recognized as a person; but has not attained the truth of this being-recognized as an independent self-consciousness". A vocabulary notice, valid for the whole study: this "individual" (*Individuum*) designates the singular human being as a possible person [the study's reading]; it is not the "individual" that the canon defines by what separates. Killing the other would destroy recognition itself, and the struggle ends in bondage. But, according to Hegel, it is the bondsman who comes to himself: he "has felt the fear of death, the absolute lord", and labor, in his words, "is desire held in check, vanishing held back; that is, it forms" (§§194–196). From forming comes *Bildung*, a word that says at once formation, education and culture: what labor and discipline make of a human being. Without fear, he says, doing would be vanity (§196) [paraphrase].

There follows the freedom that withdraws into thinking: Stoicism (§§198–200), which wants to be free "on the throne as well as in chains". It is born, Hegel notes, in an age of universal fear and bondage, but also of universal formation (§199) [paraphrase], and the objection he makes to it is the lack of content: "Freedom in thought [...] is, therefore, only the concept of freedom, not living freedom itself".

Skepticism "is the realization of that of which Stoicism was only the concept", but oscillates between the poles. The doubling of lord and bondsman then passes into a single self, and the unhappy consciousness is born, "consciousness of itself as a doubled essence, merely contradictory" (§§202–206). What it seeks lies beyond: "the unattainable beyond, which flees in the act of being grasped — or rather, has already fled" (§217). The way out passes through renunciation and mediation and arrives at Reason, when "the unchangeable is no longer an extreme for it, but is reconciled with it" (§231).

1.6 The beautiful soul and forgiveness

In the section on conscience, the beautiful soul, evil and its forgiveness (VI.C.c), Hegel portrays the purity that does not act. The beautiful soul, says §658, "in order to keep the purity of its heart, flees contact with reality"; it lacks the force of externalization (*Entäußerung*: putting oneself outside oneself, in deed and work) [paraphrase], and for that reason "goes on extinguishing itself within itself and vanishes like a formless vapor that dissolves in the air". The target, so far as the text shows, is the purity that flees from actuality (*Wirklichkeit*: not what simply happens, but what realizes its concept; see 3.4), not interiority as such. Its counterpart is the judge, who condemns the action of others without acting. To the confession of evil — "It is I" — "there follows no such return of the same confession", and he is "the hard heart, which is for itself and rejects continuity with the other" (§§666–667). Hegel does not absolve acting; he makes the hardness of judging an obstacle to recognition.

Against this hardness, forgiveness is mutual recognition through the word, and with it comes the sentence about the wounds: "The wounds of the spirit heal, and leave no scars behind; the deed is not what is imperishable, but is taken back by spirit into itself" (§669). The scope must be fixed. The wound the text speaks of is the one that moral agents cause by acting and by judging, guilt and hardness, and the cure is the work of mutual recognition (§670): "The word of reconciliation is the existing spirit [...] a reciprocal recognizing, which is absolute spirit". §669 does not speak of victims, nor of harm that no one caused: reconciliation, here, is between agents and made by them. The "reconciling Yes [...] is the God who appears in their midst" (§§670–671), a theological reading by Hegel himself; and it is through this forgiveness, already absolute spirit in figure, that the *Phenomenology* passes to religion.

1.7 The fall in the concept of spirit

Hegel has a thesis on the fall, and it must be attributed to him. In the *Encyclopaedia* (§24, Addition 3), reading Genesis 3, Hegel writes that the unity we contemplate in children as natural "must be the result of the labor and formation of spirit". And he adds: "In truth, it lies in the concept of spirit that man is evil by nature, and one must not imagine that this could be otherwise." According to Hegel, therefore, the split belongs to the concept of spirit, and its "evil" is the evil of

spirit: the subjectivity that knows and wills itself only in its particularity, to the exclusion of the universal; natural things, he observes, do no evil [paraphrase]. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, he reads in knowledge "the source of all evil" and affirms: "here is the source of evil, but also the point at which reconciliation has its ultimate source" (Marheineke ed., 1840, II, pp. 264–265). It is not a passing remark, but a piece of the system; chapter 3 will take it up again in 3.2, always under the name of the one who wrote it.

1.8 Freedom, person and worth

All this dialectic points to an idea of freedom. Hegel formulates it in the *Encyclopaedia* (§24, Addition 2): "freedom is precisely this: to be at home with oneself in one's other, to depend on oneself, to be the determinant of oneself". In the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (§7, Addition), the illustration is friendship and love, in which one "gladly limits oneself in relation to another, knowing oneself, in this limitation, as oneself". The same Addition to the *Encyclopaedia* also says that freedom exists only where there is no other for me that I myself am not [paraphrase]. Whether the other remains other in this formula is the question of 2.4.

"Person" appears in two registers. In abstract right it is the formal capacity to have rights, and the commandment of right is: "be a person and respect others as persons" (§36). But the Addition to §35 gathers both registers in a single sentence: "It is the highest achievement of a human being to be a person; yet the mere abstraction 'person' is, even in the expression, something contemptible." To reduce the person, in Hegel, to the poorest of determinations would be to keep half of the text. In the Logic, the negation of the negation, which is not an artifice of double negative but negativity turned back upon itself, is "the innermost and most objective moment of life and of spirit, by which a subject, a person, a free being is" (Doctrine of the Concept, Absolute Idea).

As to the worth of man, Hegel affirms it without hedging: in Christianity, he reads, man "is an end in himself, has in himself infinite worth and the destination for eternity" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*). And he says, in §209, Remark: "A human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc." The same §209 ties this counting to formation (*Bildung*) [paraphrase]. Worth affirmed and formation: it is between these two threads that the question of worth will be examined, in 3.1.

1.9 History as the progress of the consciousness of freedom

The philosophy of history applies this thought. Hegel opens it with a presupposition that he declares as such: "The only thought that philosophy brings with it is the simple thought of reason: that reason governs the world and that, therefore, in history too things have come to pass rationally" (*Philosophy of History*, Introduction). Philosophy demonstrates it through speculative knowledge: the thought is a result of the system, not an empirical finding [paraphrase]. The

summary formula comes further on: "World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom — a progress that we have to recognize in its necessity." The decisive verb is *to know*: "the Orientals knew only that one is free; the Greeks and Romans, that some are; we know that all human beings in themselves, man as man, are free". What changes from one epoch to another is what is known of freedom.

Hegel does not hide the sacrifices. He calls "the fact that it lets the passions act for it" the cunning of reason. And, in considering history as a "slaughter-bench" (*Schlachtbank*), at which "the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed", he asks "to whom, to what ultimate end these immense sacrifices were made". He concedes that feeling may rise "to the deepest and most helpless sadness, which no reconciling result can counterbalance", and says that the essence of these reflections is "to take pleasure, *trübselig* [gloomy], in the empty and barren sublimities of that negative result". To his answer he gives the name of theodicy: "Our consideration is, in this sense, a theodicy, a justification of God." The one who is reconciled, according to him, is "the thinking spirit". What this theodicy does, and what it fails to do, is the center of chapter 3 (see 3.2).

1.10 The consummate religion and the passage to the concept

To the summit of absolute spirit belongs the passage from representation (*Vorstellung*; see 1.1) to concept (*Begriff*). Hegel maintains that the content of philosophy and that of religion is the same (*Encyclopaedia*, §573, Remark); the difference lies in the form. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*: "Philosophy consists in transforming into the form of the concept what is in the form of representation; the content is the same, must be the same, the truth" (Marheineke ed., 1832, I, p. 80). The *Encyclopaedia* (§564, Remark) also polemicizes against the thesis that man could not know God. This is all that the passages studied say about the relation between the two forms; any consequence for religious practice would be an inference of the study, and as such will be marked.

The consummate religion (*vollendete*, absolute) is, for Hegel, the Christian one: "this is the Christian religion", he writes, and "that spirit [...] should travel its path in religion is necessary in the concept of spirit" (*Lectures*). Those that precede it form, in Marheineke's edition (1832), an order of stages of the concept of religion: those of nature (China, Buddhism, Hinduism), a transition (Persia, Egypt), those of spiritual individuality (Jewish, Greek, Roman) and, finally, the absolute one [order of 1832; later courses to be confirmed]. The order is Hegel's and all of it goes toward one end: the Christian religion, where, for him, the concept of religion is completed. The text speaks of a journey (*Bahn*), not of a ladder [paraphrase; location to be confirmed].

For Hegel, at the center of the consummate religion lies the death of God: "God has died, God is dead: this is the most terrible thought, that everything eternal, everything true is not, that negation

itself is in God". But, still according to him, "the course does not stop here": the reversal comes, and this process is "only the death of death" (Marheineke ed., 1840, II, pp. 300–301).

1.11 What a reader of Lumen Fluens should take from here

What the reader of Lumen Fluens should take from here fits into four cautions. First, Hegel's dialectic is not the triad attributed to him: it is determinate negation, and an *Aufheben* that preserves and makes cease at the same time. Second, §669 deals with guilt and forgiveness between agents, and is not a word about victims or about the evil no one caused. Third, the fall in the concept of spirit, theodicy and the "death of death" are Hegel's theses, and here they always enter attributed to him. Fourth, vocabulary: "person" has two registers in Hegel, and the "individual" of certain sentences designates the person, not the individual of the canon (see 1.5).

Here, Hegel has only been set out. What comes next belongs to the canon, in two parts: chapter 2 seeks where it walks beside Hegel; chapter 3, where it parts.

2. Where we meet

The previous chapter listened to Hegel without objecting. This one looks for what, in the canon, already walks beside him, and finds a good deal: five points of contact, each born of an element of the canon. The river, which is inheritance (2.1); change, which is a path (2.2); the doctrine that grows through objections (2.3); the home and the waters no one owns (2.4); the temple that dances (2.5). In nearly all of them a small question remains at the end, which chapter 3 will make large.

2.1 The river and spirit

Pillar II says that no one starts from zero: we are heirs of entire generations and civilizations, and ancestors of those to come. The virtue is grateful humility, knowing oneself small in the river, yet part of it; the practice is a question asked before important decisions — what did I receive that brought me here, what am I leaving for those who come after. Few philosophers carried this evidence as far as Hegel, and they did so by means of a concept the canon does not have: *Geist*, spirit as the subject of history. (The word "spirit" appears in the canon, but in another use.)

Spirit, here, is neither the soul of each one nor a God set outside the world. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel asks that the True be grasped and expressed "not only as substance, but equally as subject" (§§17–18; *nicht als Substanz, sondern ebensosehr als Subjekt*) [the study's translation], and this subject is a movement, the becoming of itself, not the singular human being who thinks (see 1.4). In the system, spirit has three figures (*Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, §385; see 1.1): the subjective, which is the soul and consciousness of each singular one; the objective, which is spirit made institution; the absolute, which is spirit knowing itself in art, religion and philosophy. It is in objective spirit that the Flumen recognizes itself: the language, the laws and the customs into which each one is born are not scenery, but the way in which spirit exists. And history, says Hegel, "is the progress of the consciousness of freedom" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Introduction).

The tradition is divided over what spirit is (see 1.4): a metaphysical reality, for Charles Taylor; the sociality of reason, for Terry Pinkard. The Flumen need not arbitrate between the two: it affirms the inheritance and says nothing about who the ultimate heir might be. We could call historical consciousness what the practice of the Flumen exercises; the canon calls it grateful humility.

The small difference lies in the attitude each asks of us before the river. The Flumen asks for inventory and gratitude: what I received, what I leave. Hegel asks for comprehension: that one recognize in history a direction and a necessity (see 1.9). That the river has direction and necessity is his thesis; in the Pillars, the canon does not formulate it. Chapter 3 will measure, in 3.2 and 3.4, what this thesis costs. The evidence, however, is common: the river is greater than the navigator, and the navigator is made of river.

2.2 Change as a path

Pillar III affirms that change is not an accident to endure but a message to carry: whoever resists the flow is dragged; whoever carries it, navigates. The virtue is availability, inner readiness for the new, without anxious attachment to what passes. The common ancestor has a name, and the Treatise on the Inner Light has already pronounced it: Heraclitus, for whom a common rational principle runs through all things in flux.

Hegel confirms it by two paths. In the *Science of Logic* (Book I, ch. 1; see 1.2), pure being, the poorest beginning of thought, proves indistinguishable from nothing — "pure being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same" —, and the truth of both is becoming (*Werden*). "Nothing" is here a logical category, not cosmology. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, on reaching the Ephesian, Hegel exclaims: "Here we see dry land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus that I have not incorporated into my Logic." He recalls as well, in Plato's voice, that Heraclitus "compares things to the current of a river — that one cannot step into the same stream twice". And of the Stoics, heirs of the Heraclitean physics, he affirms: "Thus Heraclitus and Stoicism correctly apprehended the eternal and universal process of nature." The river that Study II read in Marcus Aurelius and the river of the canon have, then, the same grandfather, and Hegel recognizes it.

To say, therefore, that Hegel is the philosopher of becoming is true with one reservation, and the reservation carries weight. Hegel builds the bridge to Heraclitus; Kierkegaard contests it. In a note of the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, published under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, after recalling that Hegel's doctrine has been paralleled with Heraclitus's, the doctrine that everything flows and nothing remains, the author writes: "This is a misunderstanding, for everything that is said in Hegel of process and becoming is illusory. That is why the System lacks an Ethics." The censure touches the place of the singular in the system and will return in 4.5 and in chapter 5; here it suffices to record that the common ancestor, for an attentive reader of Hegel, is not a matter of consensus.

The point of contact lies in not treating becoming as a defect of the world: for Hegel it is the truth of being and nothing; for Pillar III, change is vocation. The difference, which chapter 3 will open in 3.1, appears in the grammar of the Pillar itself: to carry presupposes a carrier. In the canon, change is entrusted to someone, and that someone carries a light that the canon calls timeless; in Hegel, the subject is the movement itself (see 2.1).

2.3 The method: a doctrine that grows through objections

This is the point at which the canon most resembles, in movement, what Hegel describes. The resemblance is measured without supposing dependence. The form of the Disputatio is scholastic — *videtur quod non*, *sed contra*, *respondeo* —, the form of Thomas Aquinas, to whom the Treatise turns. What singles it out is the use of the objection. In the disputation of the schools the custom is

to answer the contrary argument and keep the thesis; here the objection found a lack, and the Disputatio "prefers to declare the gap rather than close it on its own authority". The Vigil, incorporated into the canon in version 1.2, came afterward, and the editorial note publishes the text of the Disputatio whole "as testimony to the method: the doctrine grows through the objections it takes seriously". Only the founder alters the doctrine, whereas in Hegel the finite determinations overcome themselves (*das eigene Sichaufheben*, *Encyclopaedia* §81): it is a difference of authorship, which does not erase the resemblance of movement.

Hegel gives this experience a name and a logic. Dialectic, in its letter, is not the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis that the textbooks repeat (see 1.2). It is the three sides of every concept: that of the understanding, which fixes; the dialectical, or negative-rational; the speculative, or positive-rational, which "grasps the unity of determinations in their opposition" (*Encyclopaedia*, §§79–82). The force of the dialectical side comes from the way the result is taken. When "the result is grasped as it is in truth, as determinate negation, a new form immediately arises" (*Phenomenology*, Introduction, §79; see 1.2): the nothing that emerges from a refutation is not an empty nothing, but a nothing *of something*, and therefore has content and indicates the next step. Read with Hegel, the objections of the Disputatio are determinate negations in this sense. They do not say that the doctrine is false; they say what it lacks — a grammar for those who suffer evil without having chosen it, a principle of justice distinct from the Rule of Mercy —, and thereby already point to what comes next.

On what happened to the doctrine, Hegel has a word, and it is his: *Aufheben*, to preserve and to make cease at the same time (*Science of Logic*, Book I, ch. 1, Remark; see 1.3). Read with Hegel, the double meaning describes well what occurred. Everything was preserved: the four Pillars still stand, the Compass still vetoes, and the Disputatio itself was published whole. What was a lack was made to cease, in part: the canon's silence before evil suffered and evil inflicted. To the first lack, the grammar for those who suffer evil without having chosen it, the Vigil answered: it says "how we remain when the night arrives unchosen". To the second, the principle of justice, it gave the name: before the wolf, "one resists, and justice is owed, because there is a light owed to the other", without developing it. What justice that is remains open question (g), a matter for a future treatise. Pillar I remains the foundation and is no longer the canon's only word on suffering.

Hegel also makes a demand, neighboring a warning of the Disputatio without being the same. Hegel's demand concerns thinking: without "the seriousness, the pain, the patience and the labor of the negative", he notes (*Phenomenology*, Preface, §19), the idea lapses into edification (see 1.4) [paraphrase]. The Disputatio's warning concerns consolation: to say that the light is still there can be the shortcut that skips mourning, a way "to silence another's pain".

The resemblance of method has a limit, and it is the Vigil that makes it visible. The negative from which the doctrine grows is the failure of a text before an objection; the Vigil, for its part, keeps watch over the night, the evil no one caused, and commands resistance to the wolf, the evil

someone inflicts. That the canon's lack was fruitful does not make fruitful the evil the objection described, whether night or wolf. It is in the slide from one negative to the other, from thought to the world, that chapter 3 will look for the point at which Hegel's method becomes theodicy; whether it truly does is the question of 3.2. Thesis of this study, proposed to the founder, to whom the doctrine belongs: dialectic serves to make the doctrine grow; it does not serve to justify the night or the wolf.

2.4 The Common Waters and ethical life

The Common Waters say that no one navigates a private river and that the light is personal, never individual: the individual is defined by what separates him, the person, by what opens her. The Shelter, *Sis alteri domus*, adds what is offered to whoever arrives: arms, a home, confidence. Hegel reaches the neighborhood of these ideas by another road.

In Hegel, ethical life brings together family, civil society and the state (see 1.1): institutions in which, the study reads, someone recognizes himself as a member of something he did not invent and that exceeds him. What the canon asks for as maintenance of the waters — the true word put into circulation, the trust honored, the turn respected — would be, in Hegel's language, the work of ethical life [the study's reading]. Freedom, at this height, ceases to be the absence of bonds: "freedom is precisely this: to be at home with oneself in one's other, to depend on oneself, to be the determinant of oneself" (*Encyclopaedia*, §24, Addition 2). And, in love and friendship, someone willingly limits himself in relation to another and knows himself, in this limitation, as himself (*Philosophy of Right*, §7, Addition; see 1.8). It is the Hegelian formula closest to the Shelter and the Common Waters together [the study's reading]. In the same Addition to the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel also says that freedom exists only where there is no other for me that I myself am not [paraphrase]. Whether the other remains other in this formula is the question that chapter 3 will open.

Two sentences from the same book could stand on the banks of the river. "The commandment of right is, therefore: be a person and respect others as persons" (§36); and a human being "counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc." (§209, Remark). Hegel affirms the worth of man without condition of creed or origin, and elsewhere calls it infinite (see 1.8). What he makes depend on knowledge and formation (*Bildung*) [paraphrase] is the actuality of this worth (see 1.6), not the worth itself. The contact with Pillar I is, therefore, greater than is usually granted: the border, as 3.1 will show, does not run between "worth" and "without worth". Hegel puts to the religions, in the Introduction to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, a question neighboring the one that runs through the series ("what lies at the bottom of the person?"): what worth does the singular human being have in himself? From it he draws a gradation that the canon does not inherit (see 3.3).

Recognition is the other point of contact. “Self-consciousness is in and for itself insofar as, and because, it is in and for itself for an other; that is, it is only as something recognized” (*Phenomenology*, §178; see 1.5). Read with Hegel, the Shelter can be described as a practice of recognition, although the canon does not use the word: to be a home is to receive the other as someone who matters. The tradition made of this passage a social theory, and it is worth hearing it in its best form.

For Taylor, “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or by its lack, often by *misrecognition* on the part of others” (*The Politics of Recognition*, p. 25), and, again according to him, Hegel “takes it as fundamental that we can flourish only to the extent that we are recognized” (p. 50). Honneth distinguishes three forms of recognition — love, right, social esteem [paraphrase] — and only the third comes tied to the assurance of possessing capacities recognized as “valuable” (*The Struggle for Recognition*, Spanish ed., p. 158) [V-es]; the study will propose, in 3.1, that the first two do not depend on performance. Ricoeur, finally, ties recognition to gratitude: “is my gratitude not directed to those who, in one way or another, recognized my identity by recognizing me?” (*The Course of Recognition*, Spanish ed., p. 13) [V-es]. Ricoeur’s question is a neighbor of the Flumen, whose virtue is grateful humility, and of the close of the Examining, gratitude to someone from the past who made the day possible: the cleanest bridge between the Hegelian lineage and the canon [the study’s reading].

The letter, however, calls for a qualification. §178 says that self-consciousness exists only as recognized, in recognition and not before it. The gesture of the Shelter is similar — offering a home, extending arms —, but the question remains about what the gaze does: does it constitute the light of the one who arrives, or find it? It is the first border, and chapter 3 will draw it.

2.5 The eternal dances in time

The canon is sustained by two images: the temple, which is the stable, the sacred, the concrete, and the dance, which is movement, celebration and becoming. The eternal dances in time. Pillar IV adds that transcendence passes through matter: the body, the place, the rhythm — the “bricks of the temple” — are not obstacles to the spirit, they are its instrument, and the virtue is presence, being whole where the body is.

Hegel fought against the empty beyond. The figure of the unhappy consciousness, seen in 1.5, seeks “the unattainable beyond, which flees in the act of being grasped — or rather, has already fled” (*Phenomenology*, §217), and the way out passes through renunciation and mediation (§231). The lesson holds also for the self-sufficient interiority, the Stoic’s freedom that is only thought (see 1.5 and 3.4). Hegel, however, is fair to it: “the greatness of this principle must be recognized” (*History of Philosophy*, the Stoics). Study II had already said it, in its own way: an inner citadel, no; a house with open doors.

Against the beyond, spirit is real only by externalizing itself. The Idea is, writes Hegel, "the activity of setting itself over against itself, in order to be for itself, and of being, in that other, only at home with itself" (*Encyclopaedia*, §18; see 1.1), and goes so far as to "release itself freely from itself, as nature" (§244). And, on the subject of religion: "A spirit that is not manifest is not spirit" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, III) — a thesis of Hegel's on religion, which the canon, by confessional independence, neither adopts nor refutes. *Offenbar* is a false friend of "is revealed": it says a spirit that shows itself whole, with no hidden core, whereas the "is revealed" of the Lux presupposes a light that is already there (see 3.1). The Corpus speaks, here, almost the same language: if the bricks of the temple are the instrument of the spirit, a spirit without bricks would have nowhere to dance [the study's reading].

The tradition read in the unhappy consciousness medieval Christendom (Jean Wahl; Jean Hyppolite). §217 does not name the Crusades; the *Philosophy of History*, in neighboring vocabulary, says: "Christendom found the empty tomb, but not the connection of the worldly and the eternal". Whoever reads this as a critique of Christianity has the wrong address: Hegel declares himself a Lutheran — "I am one and wish to remain one" (*History of Philosophy*, Introduction) —, and the canon takes no side. What matters is the connection of the worldly and the eternal, the Hegelian name closest to what the canon calls the dance [the study's reading].

The contact is close: Hegel fights the beyond that does not enter the world and the interiority that does not act; the canon says, for its part, that transcendence passes through matter (Corpus) and that the light is for warming (Shelter). The difference, small and deep, lies in the fact that the canon keeps two images, the temple and the dance, where Hegel describes a spirit that is real only by going out of itself and that, in the other, is "only at home with itself". The canon lets the eternal be eternal, and invites it to dance [the study's reading]. Whether, in Hegel's formula, the other remains other is the question that 2.4 left, and that the next chapter will draw as a border.

3. Where we part

The two previous chapters gave Hegel his due: they presented him through the texts and showed where the canon already walks at his side. This one marks the borders, and to mark them is not to raise walls; it is to say precisely on which side each house stands. There are four. The first runs through the light: the worth of the person, which Hegel affirms, becomes actual, for him, only when it is known and formed, while for the canon it is given and is only revealed (3.1). The second runs through the night, and is the heart of the study: where theodicy reconciles, the Vigil keeps watch, and distinguishes from the night the wolf, before which one resists and justice is owed (3.2). The third runs through the name the Light receives, or does not receive (3.3). The fourth runs through the decision: the Compass asks before the path, before walking it, and the owl of Minerva — the comprehension that, according to Hegel, arrives only at dusk — takes flight afterwards (3.4). At each border the three voices remain separate: what Hegel says, what the tradition reads, what the canon answers.

3.1 The light: given or result

There is a convenient way of drawing this border, and it is inexact: to say that, for Hegel, nothing is worth anything for being given and everything is worth something for having become, and that the canon says the opposite. It is not so. Hegel affirms the worth of the person without hedging (see 1.8). Reading Christianity, he writes that man "is an end in himself, has in himself infinite worth and the destination for eternity" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*) [the study's translation]; and, in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, that "a human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc." (§209, Remark). The sentence usually taken for Hegel's thesis on this point — "of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it is in truth" (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, Preface, §20) — speaks of the Absolute as process and does not, by itself, decide anyone's worth (see 1.4). The border, if there is one, does not separate worth from the absence of worth.

It runs where Hegel himself puts the accent. What progresses, in the Introduction to the *Philosophy of History*, is a knowing: "we know that all human beings in themselves, man as man, are free" (see 1.9). That all are free in themselves is not an achievement, but the knowing of it is. §209 says the same in another way: a human being counts because he is a human being, and this counting belongs to formation (*Bildung*) [paraphrase]. Infinite worth, therefore, but actual (*wirklich*; see 1.6) only where it has been known and formed.

There is also the harshest text, which must be cited together with its counterweight: "What the subject is, is the series of his actions. If these are a series of worthless productions, the subjectivity of willing is equally worthless" (*Philosophy of Right*, §124). It speaks of moral willing, not of the

whole person, but it is Hegel's sentence closest to the wound that Pillar I exists to heal. The same §124, however, makes the right of subjective freedom the turning point between Antiquity and modernity [paraphrase] and says that "this right, in its infinitude, was enunciated in Christianity".

The canon answers through Pillar I and the Treatise on the Inner Light. The Pillar says that each person's worth is intrinsic, prior to any achievement or circumstance, and that the light is not lit — it is revealed. The Treatise explains the verb: "To light presupposes a prior absence, a void that must be filled by merit, effort or external recognition. To reveal presupposes a presence prior to any gaze — including the gaze of the one who carries it." External recognition is thus named among the things the light does not need.

Hence the formula of this border, more exact than the opposition between given and result: **actual and known**, on one side; **revealed**, on the other. In Hegel the journey is where worth is realized; in the canon, where it is seen.

Here is the false friend of which 2.5 gave notice: *offenbar*, Hegel's term closest to "revealed", says something else. "A spirit that is not manifest is not spirit" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, part III): manifestation is the being of spirit, with no hidden core. The Lux's "is revealed" presupposes a light that is already there.

It is customary to say that the person is, for Hegel, the poorest determination of spirit, and to set the canon, which with the same word names fullness, at the other end of the scale. This is half true: in Hegel's text the word already gathers the two ends, the "highest" and "something contemptible" (Addition to §35; see 1.8). The *Phenomenology* also uses it in two tones: the "individual who has not risked his life" may be recognized as a person, but has not attained the truth of this being-recognized (§187; vocabulary: see 1.5). The canon takes the person on the side of the highest and gives it fullness: "a center of interiority and freedom, irreducible to any external measure" (Treatise); "the light is personal, never individual" (Common Waters). The disagreement is not in the word, but in what is done with what it holds: in Hegel, the status of person can be conferred without the truth of being-recognized, which is won; in the canon, the person is whole before anyone confers it.

The same holds for recognition. For Hegel, self-consciousness is in recognition, not before it (§178; see 1.5). Taylor, who continues him in "The Politics of Recognition", maintains that "our identity is partly shaped by recognition" (p. 25) and reads in Hegel the thesis that we can flourish only "to the extent that we are recognized" (p. 50; see 2.4). Honneth makes of it a theory of how someone comes to relate to himself: "subjects can only arrive at a practical self-relation if they learn to conceive of themselves from the normative perspective of their interaction partners" (*The Struggle for Recognition*, Spanish ed., p. 114) [V-es]. The canon answers through the Shelter, which gives arms, home and confidence, and through the Treatise, which already knew the light capable of remaining covered "by fear, by habit, by adaptation to others' expectations". The Shelter can be read as a

practice of recognition [the study's reading]; what remains is to know what the gesture does. For Hegel, recognition constitutes self-consciousness. That the gaze of the other does not manufacture the light, the Treatise already says: to reveal presupposes a presence "prior to any gaze". Whether that gaze can reveal the hidden light, the canon does not say: it is open question (a), formulated at the end of this section.

Proposed here, as a hypothesis of the study and not as doctrine, is a formula that perhaps says more justly where the line runs. Taylor distinguishes dignity and identity: the first rests on a potential — "this potential, and not what the person has made of it, is what guarantees that each person deserves respect" (p. 41) —; the second is shaped by recognition (p. 25). The Treatise gives partial support: of the practice of examination it says that it "is not a condition of the light's existence, but a condition of its visibility to the one who carries it"; to extend this condition of visibility to the gaze of the other is a step taken by the study. The hypothesis is this: Lux = dignity; recognition = identity and visibility [the study's hypothesis]. Read in this way, the lineage of Hegel and Honneth deals with the second, and what the Treatise refuses is that recognition constitute worth.

Honneth, whom 2.4 has already heard, helps with his three forms of recognition, love, right and social esteem [paraphrase]. The wound of the Treatise, worth measured by performance, would be the pathology of the third; the first two do not depend on performance. Honneth would stand closer to the Lux than is supposed; the difference remains: for him self-relation is acquired only through the perspective of others (p. 114); for the canon worth comes first, and that visibility should depend on the other is part of the hypothesis. The hypothesis is the study's, not Hegel's, Taylor's or the canon's; only the founder decides whether to adopt it.

It would be convenient to conclude that twentieth-century philosophy supports, as a bloc, the order of the canon — first the light, then the Shelter. It does not: each voice sustains one half. Scheler speaks most clearly of the first. The person of the law of the state, he writes, is not "created on the basis of a constitution, but at most recognized by it", and "no 'devotion' to such a bearer of value confers on the person, only then, a value that she did not possess before" (*Formalism*, pp. 386, n. 1, and 524): *anerkannt*, and not *geschaffen*, is a pair neighboring what the Treatise calls visibility and existence. But Scheler reads Hegel from outside: in him the person would be an "indifferent point of passage of an impersonal rational activity" (p. 386), a charge that the infinite worth of man and the guilt imputed to the single subject (*Philosophy of Right*, §139) contest. And the same page 524 arrives at the *Person der Personen, d. i. Gottes*, the person of persons, that is, God [paraphrase]: confessional material, registered without being adopted.

Mounier and Maritain sustain the other half. For Mounier, "the thou, which implies the we, is prior to the I or, at least, accompanies it" (*Personalism*, p. 20) [V-en]. Maritain, the closest parallel to the Common Waters, sees in individuality "the narrowness of the ego" (*The Person and the Common Good*, ch. III) [V-en], but within the framework of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, who refuses to treat individual and person as two realities.

Buber brings both things. "The Thou comes to meet me by grace: it is not found by seeking" has the form of "the light is not lit — it is revealed", said of the other; "In the beginning is the relation" puts the relation before the I (*I and Thou*, pp. 18 and 25).

Levinas gives, in *Totality and Infinity*, the letter most favorable to the order of the canon: "Recollection in a home open to the Other — hospitality — is the concrete and initial fact of human recollection and separation" (English ed., p. 172) [V-en], the home before the encounter. But he contests that the other is, "as Hegel would like to say", the negation of the same (p. 305) [V-en]. Hegel writes, in the Addition to §24 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, that freedom exists only where there is no other for me that I myself am not [paraphrase]: as to whether this makes the other a moment of the same — a question that 2.4 and 2.5 left open —, the tradition is divided, and the study does not decide. Mounier, Maritain, Buber and Levinas enter here as philosophical material; their confessional roots are not adopted.

Ricoeur holds both ends, and for that reason does not resolve the order. Besides the question about gratitude, which 2.4 has already heard, he imagines, for the agent who is forgiven, a liberating word whose formula would be "you are worth more than your acts" (*Memory, History, Forgetting*, Spanish ed., p. 643) [V-es]: worth beyond the acts, but worth spoken by someone.

The study records here a question that the canon has not yet decided. The canon sets out the light first and the Shelter afterwards: the Pillars say who we are; the Shelter, what we offer to those who reach us; "The Compass protects my light; the Shelter offers it." If the thou is prior to the I, or if in the beginning is the relation, this order is inverted, or at least complicated. Open question (a): does the Lux come before the Shelter, or does the relation come first? There is a possible attenuation, to be tested: the Lux answers *how much* the person is worth; Mounier and Buber, *how the I becomes I*; and the Flumen already says that no one starts from zero. The finer question, however, remains unanswered: can the hidden light be revealed by the gaze of another? It falls to the founder to say whether the Shelter is the place where the Thou can come, as in Buber, or what the Lux already offers before any encounter.

The first border spoke of what the person is worth and of how that worth is known. The second sets the person before what she did not choose.

3.2 The night: the Vigil against theodicy

Hegel did not ignore evil. He gave his consideration of history the name of theodicy (see 1.9), and the purpose, he writes, is that "evil [*Übel*] in the world be comprehended and the thinking spirit reconciled with evil [*Böse*]", a reconciliation that "is attained only through the knowledge of the affirmative, in which that negative disappears as subordinate and overcome" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Introduction). The one who is reconciled is the thinking spirit and, according to Hegel, the condition is to know that the end has been realized and that evil has not prevailed

alongside it. Hegel distinguishes this reconciliation from resignation — it is likewise not "content with cold despair" (Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*) —, but he promises compensation to no one: at the end, he confesses to having renounced the attraction of "describing more closely the interest of their destiny in pain and joy". To say that, for Hegel, the sacrifice is redeemed by the result is to say more than the text says; the exact criticism is another: the victim does not enter into the account.

It is fitting to have before one's eyes what the canon distinguishes, because everything that follows depends on it. The Vigil says: "The night is the evil no one caused — before it, one keeps watch. The wolf is the evil someone inflicts — before it, one does not keep watch: one resists, and justice is owed, because there is a light owed to the other." And it promises "presence, not victory". With this lens one reads what Hegel says of evil, and what he leaves unsaid.

Hegel concedes more to mourning than is usually supposed. In the slaughterhouse paragraph (see 1.9) — *Schlachtbank*, slaughter-bench, with no butcher named —, he admits a sadness "which no reconciling result can counterbalance". But he censures what remains: the gloomy (*trübselig*) [the study's translation] delight in the "empty and barren sublimities" of the negative result. And, after saying that God has died — "the highest pain, the feeling of the complete absence of salvation" —, he writes, shortly afterwards: "But the course does not stop here; the reversal sets in" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 1840, II, pp. 300–301; see 1.10). Mourning is conceded; permanence in it, not. Whoever reads the Vigil as permanence finds the objection ready here. The canon answers through the Disputatio, which already feared the shortcut that "skips mourning instead of sustaining it", and through the Vigil, which does not contemplate the dark: it "creates within it a circle of clarity where one can be".

The passage of Hegel closest to the Vigil is in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* (§32). The life of spirit "is not the one that shrinks from death and keeps itself pure from devastation; it is the one that endures it and maintains itself in it", and spirit is this power "only by looking the negative in the face, by tarrying with it". Up to here it is almost the Vigil. But the sentence goes on: "This tarrying is the magical power that converts it into being." Two reservations, in fairness. The "death" of the passage names, in context, the unreality (*Unwirklichkeit*) of what the understanding separates [paraphrase], and not anyone's mourning. And it is not enough to say that Hegel keeps watch in order to convert: the tarrying of §32 is the power of the spirit that thinks, and the tarrying that delights in the negative result is what he himself censures in the slaughterhouse paragraph. The gesture is the same — to stay, not to flee —, and the end is another. According to Hegel, tarrying is a power that converts; in the Vigil it is presence for the one who is in the dark, with no promise about what the dark will become. The same vigil, with two ends; and the end changes everything.

The root of the difference is theological, and the canon, by confessional independence, does not resolve it: the study describes it. It is the same root as the thesis on the fall (see 1.7): according to Hegel, the split belongs to the concept of spirit, and the point at which "the source of evil" lies is

also the one at which "reconciliation has its ultimate source". Hegel says, in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802), that it is necessary to re-establish "the speculative Good Friday, which was previously historical, [...] in all the truth and harshness of its absence of God", and that only from this harshness "the supreme totality [...] can and must rise again in the most serene freedom of its shape". Infinite pain must be designated "purely as a moment, but also not as more than a moment of the supreme idea" [location to be confirmed]. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* the figure is completed: God, Hegel writes, "preserves himself in this process, and this is only the death of death" (see 1.10), and the pain of the world was, in his words, "the condition, the preparation of the subjective side for the consciousness of the free spirit" (1840, II, pp. 301 and 192) [location to be confirmed]. According to Hegel, therefore, the negative is a "moment". That the "can and must" expresses the necessity of the reversal is a reading of the study, not Hegel's word.

The canon answers through the Vigil, with an image that is the study's and not the doctrine's: a Friday night with no guarantee of morning. The doctrine does not write the morning, for the light "does not promise the dawn, nor pretend it is not night"; neither does it deny it. There is, in the canon, no clause saying that the night is necessary, that loss prepares a greater good, that pain will be understood from a higher point. The believer may read a morning in the faith he professes, the non-believer will not read it, and the philosophy decides for no one; the Vigil depends on neither of the two readings. That is why it is not despair, since the light is lit: it is fidelity.

It would be an error to oppose to "the wounds of the spirit heal, and leave no scars behind" (*Phenomenology*, §669) the idea that, in Lumen Fluens, wounds leave a scar, as if Hegel were speaking of the evil no one caused. He is not (see 1.6). The wound of §669 is the one that moral agents cause by acting and by judging, guilt and the hardness of the judge; the cure is the work of mutual recognition, the "word of reconciliation" of §670. To use it against the night displaces its scope. The canon, moreover, does not say that wounds leave a scar: the Disputatio writes that "the damage is real" and refuses that evil be the final judge of human worth. The natural neighbor of §669 is the Rule of Mercy, which is reflexive — failing the rule does not extinguish the light; the river "takes it up again" —, and not the Vigil.

Hegel says little of the victim. In the passages read for this study, the only innocent one named is a flower, and in passing: the world-historical figure "has to trample many an innocent flower", conduct that "is subject to moral censure". Individuals "are sacrificed and abandoned", although there is "something eternal and divine in themselves", which makes them ends in themselves; the happiness of each is handed over to the realm of contingency [paraphrase]. Hegel's terms do not coincide with the canon's. The perishing of history is, in his own words, the work not only of nature but of the will of men [paraphrase], which in the language of the Vigil belongs in good part to the wolf; illness and death, the nearer relatives of the night, enter the system, according to Hegel, as a passage to spirit (*Encyclopaedia*, §375; Addition to §376 [paraphrase]). The reconciliation

of the thinking spirit with evil includes, in the language of the Vigil, in good part what it commands to be resisted [the study's reading].

The tradition has read this absence as the blind spot of the system. Adorno says that "the need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth" (*Negative Dialectics*, p. 29) [V via secondary source] and writes that the feeling "rebels [...] against the fact that a meaning is squeezed from the fate of the victims, however exhausted it may be" (p. 352). In Benjamin's Thesis IX, the angel of history "would like to stop to awaken the dead and gather the fragments" [V via secondary source]; the thesis does not name Hegel, and the reading against the *Philosophy of History* is the interpreters'. Levinas writes that "the justification of the neighbor's pain is, certainly, the source of all immorality" ("Useless Suffering", in *Entre Nous*) [V-pt].

Ricoeur draws a neighboring division, on another axis: for action, evil "must be combated"; before suffering, the question moves from "Why?" to "Why me?" (*Evil*, Spanish ed., pp. 60 and 62) [V-es]. And he warns that evil committed and evil suffered are intertwined [V via secondary source]. Open question (l): where does the border between night and wolf run when the evil suffered is, in part, committed? Metz and Neiman pointed to the same gap [V via secondary source; location to be confirmed]. These are readings, not Hegel; they converge, however, on what the text confirms.

Two voices of confessional root enter here as material, not as doctrine: the canon does not adopt them; the study names them because they illuminate the interval and the Vigil. The first is the theology of Holy Saturday, the day between Friday and the morning. Balthasar thinks it as the being-dead of Christ, solidarity with the dead within the paschal mystery (*Mysterium Paschale*, 1970) [paraphrase; location to be confirmed]. The counterpoint is Hegel against that theology, not against the canon.

The second is Simone Weil, in the essay "The Love of God and Affliction". Affliction, she writes, is "above all anonymous": it "deprives those it strikes of their personality and makes them into things", and they will "never again believe that they are anyone". The book of Job is, for her, "a pure marvel of truth and authenticity", and "the soul must go on loving in the void": no explanation, permanence without victory, although the text goes on with a visit from God, which the Vigil does not promise. In these two movements Weil is an ally of the Vigil; in the third, not: those we call criminals "are nothing but tiles loosened from a roof by the wind", and the horrors "contain a beauty". This dissolves the wolf into the night, which the canon calls abdication, and comes close to saying that horror is necessary, which the Vigil, in promising presence and not victory, does not say. To cite her without this limit would be selective citation.

And there is the wolf. Hegel says that world history is the "world's court of judgment" (*Philosophy of Right*, §340), and from there it is easy to conclude that he hands justice over to the outcome. Three things must be corrected, in Hegel's favor. First: world history, he writes, "is not the mere verdict of its might, i.e. the abstract and irrational necessity of a blind fate" (§342); guilt and

innocence, happiness and unhappiness, of states and of individuals, "have, in the sphere of conscious actuality, their determinate significance and value, and in it find their judgment and their justice, imperfect though it is. World history falls outside these points of view" (§345). Second: the world's court judges peoples; the individual case has its own forum, which "falls to a public power, the court" (§219). Third: on the plane of the agent, Hegel rejects that the end sanctifies the means — "the holy end is nothing more than the subjective opinion about what is good and better" (§140, Remark) — and imputes to the single subject, "without restriction", the guilt of his evil (§139).

The cost lies in other paragraphs (§§347–351). On the plane of peoples, before the bearer of the epoch, "the spirits of the other peoples are without rights" (*rechtlos*, §347); the founding of states may count as *Heroenrecht*, the right of heroes (§350) [paraphrase]; the "barbarians" have an unequal right (§351) [paraphrase]. These are the paragraphs most contrary to what the canon says of the wolf. The canon answers through the Vigil: before the wolf "one does not keep watch: one resists, and justice is owed, because there is a light owed to the other". There is no forum of the outcome, not even for peoples: the light owed to the other is owed now [the study's reading].

At this point, in the study's reading, the Vigil stands beside the readers who refused reconciliation after the catastrophes that history did not redeem, and the most exact company is Adorno's. He inverts the sentence of the Preface to the *Phenomenology* — "the True is the whole" — into "the whole is the false" (*Minima Moralia*, §29) [V-en]. And he writes that Hitler imposed on men "a new categorical imperative: to organize their thinking and acting in such a way that Auschwitz will not be repeated, that nothing similar will happen" (*Negative Dialectics*, p. 356). The imperative corresponds to the "one resists" of the wolf; the Vigil shares the refusal, without adopting the author.

Adorno is an ally with thorns: "no word tinged with elevation, not even the theological one, has any right, without being transformed, after Auschwitz" (p. 358), and the canon speaks of light and of temple — open question (d), to be decided by the founder. And in §33 of *Minima Moralia* he confesses an impasse: he would not be an executioner at any price, but he would not want to stop anyone who wished to avenge past atrocities, "an unsatisfactory answer, contradictory from end to end" [V-en]. To avenge perpetuates horror and to spare leaves evil unpunished [paraphrase]. The Vigil says that justice is owed in the face of the wolf and does not say what justice that is; the Rule of Mercy deals with those who fail the rule, not with sparing the authors of evil. Open question (g): the justice owed in the face of the wolf, and distinct from vengeance. The editorial note to the Disputatio takes the two gaps as answered by the Vigil; in the study's reading, the Vigil answered the first (the Compass with no formulation for the evil suffered) and named the second, "justice is owed", without developing it. What justice that is, and how it is distinguished from vengeance, the text of the canon does not formulate: it is a matter, as the Disputatio itself foresaw, for "a dedicated treatise".

Thus one arrives at the thesis of the study. Hegel looked evil in the face, conceded mourning, rejected the holy end, maintained the guilt of the single subject and justice in the forum where it belongs; this study acknowledges it. The Vigil does not take the next step: it promises presence, not victory. The next step would be that the negative, looked in the face, be converted; that the course, as Hegel says, "does not stop here"; that the pain of the world be read as "condition" and "preparation". These are Hegel's steps, and his alone. Dialectic as a method is the discovery that a doctrine grows through the objections it takes seriously (2.3): the negative from which it grows is the failure of a text before an objection, and not the night before the one who crosses it. As theodicy, dialectic reads the night from the end; the Vigil reads it from the one who is in it. Hence the formula of the study, which only the founder can adopt: to accept dialectic as a method of doctrinal growth and to refuse it as theodicy.

And hence the question that the study proposes to the founder as the second face of the series, which until now asked what lies at the bottom of the person: what lies at the bottom of the night? According to Hegel, a reason with which the thinking spirit can be reconciled. The canon does not describe a bottom of the night: it promises presence, and "no one shall be without light inside the night". The answer the study proposes is a light lit inside the night, which does not need the end in order to be worth something.

3.3 The nameless light: against the hierarchy of religions

Two borders are drawn, that of the light and that of the night. The third runs through the name. Hegel orders the religions, and the measure that one of his texts lets us see, and that the study takes as its yardstick, is the worth that each recognizes in the person; the canon, by confessional independence, does not order them.

In the Introduction to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel writes: "In the Eastern religions the main relation is this: only the one substance, as such, is the true, and the individual has no worth in himself [...]. In the Greek and Christian religion, on the contrary, the subject knows himself to be free and must thus be preserved" (*keinen Wert in sich*). The *Individuum* that there has or has not worth designates the singular human being, the person in the canon's sense (see 1.5). The "individual" of the Common Waters, defined by what separates him, is akin to what Hegel names, on other pages, *ausschließende Einzelheit*, the singularity that excludes (see 4.1) [the study's reading]. Read in this way, the yardstick asks a question neighboring the question of the series, what lies at the bottom of the person, and for that reason deserves to be weighed, not merely refused.

The answer, however, is that of a journey. What history gradually conquers is the knowing of the person's worth: according to Hegel, this knowing goes from "one is free" to "some are" and to "all

human beings in themselves" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Introduction; see 1.9). The verb is to know, and it is on this that the yardstick rests (see 3.1).

The order of the religions follows the same movement. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* of 1832 it runs from nature to spiritual individuality, and from there to the "consummate" religion, the Christian (the list is in 1.10; later courses alter the order [location to be confirmed]). The order is Hegel's and goes wholly toward an end, since each religion is a stage of the concept of religion; the text, however, speaks of a journey, not of a "ladder" [paraphrase; location to be confirmed]. At the summit of this order a passage is thought, from representation to concept, which Hegel himself formulates as a change of form with the same content (see 1.10). It is a general thesis, about the forms of absolute spirit. None of the passages read on it speaks of prayer or of liturgy; any consequence for practice would be an inference of the study, and as such will be marked.

Hegel speaks also of two lights. The Persian religion, which he calls the religion of the Good (*Religion des Guten*), is the "religion of light". Hegel says: "The Good is still the Good in general [...] the Good that still has existence in a natural way; this is, in general, what is called the religion of light" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 1832, I) [page to be confirmed]. And, in the 1827 review of Humboldt's essay on the *Bhagavad Gita*, there appears the prayer of a Brahmin to the sun, "the mysterious light [...] that dwells in me" (*Das geheimnisvolle Licht [...], das in mir wohnt*) [the study's translation]. The Persian religion of light is the Good still abstract and natural, not yet spirit [the study's reading]; the Brahmin's prayer belongs to another house and to its lexicon (see 4.4). The canon speaks of interior and personal light, not of natural light nor of a religion of light, and for that reason the study takes neither of the two as support. Whether either of them is the Light under another name, the canon does not decide: the name stays with each one.

Modern interpreters ask how much of the hierarchy comes from Hegel's scheme and how much from the sources he had. Hegel depended on second-hand accounts: the envoy Turner, Rémusat, Colebrooke. Roger-Pol Droit showed that the European nineteenth century saw in Buddhism a "cult of nothingness" that projected its own nihilism (*The Cult of Nothingness*, 1997) [V via secondary source]. Deyve dos Santos concludes that Hegel misreads the Buddhist doctrine and practices by using the sources of his time (*Revista Dialectus*, 2014) [V via secondary source]. For Kwok Kui Wong, the low judgment on Laozi would come from Hegel's developmental view (*Philosophy East and West*, 2011) [V via secondary source]. The details are in 4.1 and 4.6.

The canon, for its part, does not grade houses, and the reason is written in it: "Lumen Fluens belongs to no official religion — and excludes none. For the believer, the Light has a proper name: for the Christian, it is God himself. For the non-believer, it is the deepest conscience, the true-in-oneself. The philosophy decides this for no one; it demands only fidelity to the light, whatever name each person gives it" (Confessional independence). To grade the houses would be to decide which of the names says more of the Light, and to decide is precisely what the philosophy does not

do. That is why the study does not discuss whether the summit of Hegel's order is well placed: to discuss it would be to take sides, and the canon does not take sides.

There is a second reason, one of structure. The yardstick measures what each house *knows* of the person's worth; the Lux, "prior to any achievement or circumstance", does not wait for that knowing. Whoever inhabits a house that, in Hegel's letter, does not recognize this worth has no less light for that. To think otherwise would reintroduce, in reverse, the performance that Pillar I exists to heal: each light, says the Treatise on the Inner Light, is "not relative, not comparative, not subject to ranking". Hegel grades because his answer is a journey; the series visits houses because its answer is a light (see 4.7). And "a philosophy that needs to diminish others in order to exist does not trust its own light" (Principle of the series).

As for the passage from representation to concept, the canon does not adopt it and this study does not judge it. To adopt it, however, would amount, by an inference of the study, to saying that the name the believer gives to the Light and the deepest conscience of the non-believer express one and the same content in two forms, one of them more adequate. It would be taking sides among the names of the Light, and confessional independence leaves the name to each one. The Antiphon is what the canon deliberately does not explain, and the study does not either.

One open question remains (h), and it is the study's, not Hegel's. In the Eastern houses Hegel declares the highest to be indeterminate and sees nothingness in this, and returns the accusation to Europe: the moderns' "God cannot be known" is, he says, "only a milder expression" of "God is nothingness" (see 4.7). The canon, for its part, leaves the Light without a name. Would this reserve be reached by the accusation that the indeterminate is nothing? Against the accusation: without a name is not without determination, for the canon's light is "personal, timeless and irreducible" (close of the sheets of Studies I–VI) and has a practice, the Kindling, the Carrying, the Examining. In its favor: these determinations come from life and from the Pillars, not from the concept, and whoever reads the canon with the yardstick of the *Logic* may see, in what is left undecided, a determination that is lacking. Whether a nameless light can be determined by life without being determined by the concept remains to be answered.

3.4 The Compass before the owl

The fourth border runs through the hour of decision. The Compass vetoes before the path is walked, and philosophy, Hegel says, arrives only at dusk.

"What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational" (Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*). The sentence does not canonize what exists. *Wirklich*, actual (see 1.6), is a technical term, and the *Encyclopaedia* (§6, Remark) separates emphatic actuality from random existence: "In common life, one calls actuality, at random, for example, every sudden idea, error, evil [...]" [the study's translation]. Evil, in this register, is not actual; Hegel deserves to be read thus. The sentence belongs

to a larger position, the one according to which "reason governs the world and [...] in history, too, things have taken place rationally" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Introduction). And it belongs to a task: "To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present [...] this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality", which "is not content with cold despair either" (Preface; see 3.2). For Hegel, therefore, to be reconciled is to know, and not to resign oneself. And one knows late: philosophy arrives "always too late" "to teach how the world ought to be", for "the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk". The Preface speaks of the office of philosophy; it does not say what each one must decide tomorrow [the study's reading].

The same Hegel, however, presses on what the canon calls the Compass. Stoicism, he writes in the *Phenomenology* (§200), "was therefore in a quandary when asked [...] about the criterion of truth": its words, true, good, wisdom, virtue, are general and uplifting, but without unfolding, and "soon begin to bore". It is the objection of 1.5 seen from the other side: the freedom that is only thought is "only the concept of freedom", with no content to orient it. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* the objection gains a technical name. The cognitive impression, "the famous criterion of truth of the Stoics", is "very formal"; their criterion "is the principle of contradiction"; and, in ethics, Hegel concludes: "No ultimate and decisive criterion of what is good can be established." He adds, however: "Even though this independence and freedom is only formal, the greatness of this principle must be recognized."

Two modern readers help to weigh the objection. Pierre Hadot rehabilitated, by implication, the "parenetic" that Hegel disdained: what seemed to him a sermon was spiritual exercise (*Spiritual Exercises and Ancient Philosophy*, 2014) [the study's inference; page to be confirmed]. Long and Sedley recall that the Stoa answered the question about the criterion with the cognitive impression, which Hegel himself names (*The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1987) [location to be confirmed]. Between §200 and the *Lectures* the criticism passes from the lack of a criterion to its form, from "in a quandary" to "formal" [the study's reading]. It is to this second blow that the Compass is exposed.

The canon's answer begins with the letter of the Compass, which "chooses no one's paths; it only vetoes those that would require extinguishing the light in order to walk them". Hegel's objection strikes what the Stoic claimed to be, a criterion of truth. In the study's formulation, the Compass is a veto of fidelity, not a criterion of truth. It does not ask what is true or what is good: it asks whether the light is there and whether one can be there whole, without betraying oneself, and the canon says why: "Because I, without my light, am a lie." Read thus, it is formal, and the form belongs to its office: a veto that binds without condition cannot depend on a doctrine of the good.

But if the Compass were the whole of the canon's ethics, the objection would hold in full. It is not. It is the first of the four elements raised upon the Pillars, and the canon says so: "The Compass protects my light; the Shelter offers it." The positive content comes from outside the veto, and from three places. From the Shelter, with its "arms where the weary rest, a home for those tired of being alone". From the Common Waters, where "all of this is maintenance of the waters": the true word

put into circulation, the trust honored, the turn respected, the common space cared for. And from the Vigil, which before the wolf commands to resist and owes justice (what justice that is remains open: question (g), in 3.2).

The Disputatio, moreover, had already recognized on its own account that the Compass, alone, does not cover evil suffered: it "does not yet possess an equivalent clause" for the one who did not choose the path, and the gap called for "a principle distinct from the veto" (*ad secundum*). The Vigil came to answer that gap.

It remains to know whether this suffices, and the question is declared as open question (i), the study's and not Hegel's. Hegel records that, in Stoic ethics, the subject decides from himself, with conscience (*Gewissen*) as the last instance [paraphrase]; the question "is the light there?" is also asked by the subject himself. In the canon, the content comes from the Shelter, which names gestures (arms, home, confidence), and from the Common Waters, which name goods, not institutions; together, they put the other and the common into the life of the one who asks. But whether this takes from the Compass its last solitary judge, the study does not decide.

Two figures from chapter 1 return here (see 1.6). The beautiful soul flees contact with reality in order to keep the purity of its heart; its pair, the judge, is "the hard heart, which is for itself and rejects continuity with the other" (*Phenomenology*, §§658 and 666–667). And there is the slaughterhouse passage (see 1.9), in which Hegel says that perishing is the work not only of nature but of the will of men [paraphrase]. There he calls egoism (*Selbstsucht*) the withdrawal of one who "is on the quiet bank" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Introduction).

The answer comes from the Bank: "To withdraw is not to dam: whoever moors does not divert the river — they shield the lamp from the wind." And it adds: "The bank is also river; the silence at the water's edge is also presence." It distinguishes retreat from abuse by two marks: "retreat is discreet, and it keeps the light in order to return it to the flow". The study reads the two marks as an answer to Hegel's two figures. Discretion excludes the judge, because retreat does not shout its own absence nor judge those who stay; the returning excludes the purity that guards only itself, the museum lamp that the Shelter had already condemned.

Hegel is right on two counts, and the study concedes them in the name of the Bank. The first: the marks can be invoked by anyone, and the beautiful soul is capable of calling itself retreat; to verify them falls to the Examining of the one who withdraws [the study's reading]. The second: the Bank does not serve as an alibi before the wolf. If perishing is the work of human will, the Vigil has a name for that, the wolf, and says that the wolf is what the light "confronts whenever it appears"; to mistake it for the night is abdication. That Hegel's sentence touches the canon's distinction is a reading of the study; it does not reproduce it. The text of the Bank concerns those who "need to be near without joining"; it does not apply it to the wolf. And the image is inverted: Hegel's quiet bank is the withdrawal he calls egoism; in the canon, the bank is also river.

Hegel, thus, is not against the Compass: the owl and the Compass answer questions of different hours. The canon itself has its owl, the Examining at the end of the day and the review of the river each season, in which one looks back and names "what changed in me, what I resisted in vain, what I delivered well" (comprehension done at dusk [the study's reading]). But the Compass is a question asked before the path, before walking it, without waiting for history to show whether it was rational; and the whole night comes after the dusk in which the owl begins its flight. The owl sees at dusk; the Vigil is for the night: *Lux in tenebris vigilat*.

Four borders are drawn: the light, which is revealed; the night, in which one keeps watch; the name, which is left to each one; the hour, in which one decides.

4. Hegel facing the houses we have already visited

Hegel's yardstick (3.3) and the question about the content of the Compass (3.4) now go to the six houses the series has already visited. The yardstick asks a question neighboring that of the series (what lies at the bottom of the person?): what is the *Individuum* worth in itself? Hegel does not deny the worth of the person (see 1.8), but sees it as actual only where it has been known and formed (*Bildung*), and from this comes the order of the religions in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* of 1832 (see 1.10), with its stages of the concept of religion, which are his own and all lead to a single end. The series does not inherit them: the border with the Lux runs between the "actual/known" and the "revealed", not between having worth and lacking it (see 3.1), and it visits houses, it does not rank them (see 3.3). When this chapter sets "dignity" over against "emptiness", it speaks of the person; that Hegel's *Individuum*, the singular human being, corresponds to the canon's person is the study's reading (vocabulary: see 1.5 and 3.3).

Hegel knew five of the six houses. Three, Buddhism, Vedanta and the China of the Tao, he saw from afar, through the accounts of travelers, Jesuits and orientalists; two, Stoicism and Christianity, were familiar to him. Existentialism came later, and of it the others speak. As for the sources: the passages on history and the religions come from lectures gathered by disciples after the master's death; from his own hand are the published works (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, *Science of Logic*, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*) and the 1827 review of Humboldt's essay on the *Bhagavad-Gita*. In each house the order is the same: what Hegel wrote; what the tradition discusses; what the sheet, the published summary of the corresponding study, had already said; and what the canon answers. In this last voice, the canon's words go in quotation marks or carry the name of the element; whatever goes beyond that is the study's reading. The translations into Portuguese are working translations; where the sources gave only the original, the Portuguese is the study's, and the Sources say which they are.

4.1 Buddhism

Hegel treats Buddhism, together with Lamaism, as the *Religion des Insichseins*, the religion of being-in-itself. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Part II), he says that it, "however low and poor it may seem, [...] stands higher than the one that says: God cannot be known", and writes that there "nothingness and non-being is the ultimate and the highest". He affirms that nirvana is annihilation, "the highest" for man. He records, however, that the first attribute of the Dalai Lama is "forgetfulness and compassion". In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, he says of Lamaism that excluding singularity (*ausschließende Einzelheit*), a relative of the "individual" of the Common Waters [the study's reading], remains "subordinated to that substantiality"; and, in the chapter on China, that Fo posits "contempt for the individual" (*Verachtung des Individuums*) as perfection [the

study's translation]. These are his words, in which the *Individuum* is the person [the study's reading], and the series does not adopt them.

Modern readers begin with Hegel's sources. He depended on an English envoy, Turner, and merged "Fo, Buddha, Dalai Lama" into a single figure, although he admits "a difference between Buddhism and Lamaism". Roger-Pol Droit showed that the European nineteenth century saw in Buddhism a "cult of nothingness" that projected its own nihilism (*The Cult of Nothingness*, 1997 [V via secondary source]); Deyve dos Santos maintains that Hegel misreads the doctrine and the practices by using sources of his time (2014 [V via secondary source]). In the Buddhist tradition's own terms, *nibbāna* is the extinction of thirst, not of being [paraphrase; location to be confirmed].

Study I met Buddhism in impermanence, in mindfulness, in the non-attachment of Mutatio and in the compassion (*mettā*) of the Shelter; it parted over timeless light versus *anattā*, celebration versus renunciation and dignity versus emptiness (*śūnyatā*).

For the study, Hegel serves to name the border: the yardstick's question falls where the sheet put "dignity vs. emptiness", and the compassion he saw in the Dalai Lama confirms the meeting point at *mettā*. The risk lies in the "nothingness": if it passes from label to description, criticism undoes it, and adopting it would betray the rule of presenting each house in its best form. Hegel is used to locate the border, not to say what Buddhism is; the demand he himself makes of the religions judges him (see 4.7).

4.2 Stoicism

The *Phenomenology* gives Stoicism the freedom "on the throne as well as in chains" and its limit (see 1.5 and 3.4). §199 names no one; reading an emperor and a slave into it is the commentators' reading. The *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* name Seneca, Epictetus and Antoninus and take their philosophy in "a rhetorical and parenetic direction, of which, as of our sermons [...], no mention can be made". Hegel recognizes, however, Stoicism's kinship with Heraclitus (see 2.2) and the greatness of the Stoic principle, though formal (see 3.4).

Here criticism contests a judgment, not a source. Pierre Hadot, as seen in 3.4, rehabilitated by implication the "parenetic" as a spiritual exercise [the study's inference; page to be confirmed]: what Hegel took for a sermon was a practice of life.

Study II called Stoicism the closest relative in practice: Heraclitus's river, the *lógos*, Seneca's nightly examination, ancestor of the Examining, and Epictetus's carrying of the involuntary. It parted over *apatheia* versus celebration, love of fate versus message and inner citadel versus the Shelter.

For the study, Hegel explains why, on the sheet, "inner citadel, no": freedom in thought alone is a concept without life. Of whoever venerates necessity, the ground of love of fate, he acknowledges "greatness and calm", but calls that freedom "only the abstract one" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of*

Religion); the consolation he sets against it is, according to Hegel, the one in which "the negative converts into the affirmative" — which the Vigil does not endorse. The price is twofold. Hegel takes from philosophy the exercise that Study II calls the ancestor of the Examining, and his judgment that the criterion is formal reaches the Compass, which, in the canon's words, "only vetoes". Where does the positive content come from? The question stays open, as question (i); 3.4 examines it.

4.3 Christianity

Hegel calls Christianity the "consummate religion" (*vollendete Religion*), and also "manifest" (*offenbare*): "A spirit that is not manifest is not spirit" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Part III). Its content is the Incarnation (*Phenomenology*, §759). He asks that the principle of religion be sought "in the living spirit, in yourselves", not "in the tomb among the dead" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*), and declares himself a Lutheran, "and wish to remain one" (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Introduction). In the volumes consulted, Augustine, the one of Study III, hardly appears: there are six occurrences, all marginal; one of them, in summarizing Malebranche, attributes to him "Do not say that you yourselves are your own light" [location to be confirmed].

Kierkegaard, through Johannes Climacus, writes that "speculation must not be called Christian", a sentence that names Hegel's pure thinking, *Hegels rene Tænken* (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, 1846); through Anti-Climacus, that God and man must not "run together into one [...] in the System" (*Sygdommen til Døden*, or *The Sickness unto Death*, 1849), without naming Hegel. Hegel is discussed by Barth, criticized by Balthasar and read with sympathy by Küng and by Jüngel [paraphrase; location to be confirmed]. And it is Wahl's and Hyppolite's reading, not Hegel's, that the unhappy consciousness is medieval Christendom: §217 of the *Phenomenology* speaks of a tomb, without naming the Crusades; it is the *Philosophy of History* that names them.

Study III called it the deepest convergence and the most important border: dignity prior to merit (the image of God), the light of John 1:9, Augustine, mercy, the Shelter. It parted over structure versus revelation — "we do not name the origin of the Light" —, absence of worship and silence about what comes after the river.

For the study, Hegel brings one thing right, in placing the principle in the living spirit and not in the tomb, and four difficulties. First: *offenbar* is a false friend (see 3.1). In Hegel it is the spirit that cannot fail to manifest itself, with no hidden core, God "no longer a beyond, an unknown"; the "is revealed" of Pillar I presupposes a light that is already there. Second: two of his theses are philosophical, and with them the canon does not decide the origin of the Light. The one, that the spirit that perceives the divine "is the divine spirit itself" (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Introduction), and the other, that the knowledge God has of himself is "his self-consciousness in man" (*Encyclopaedia*, §564, Remark, in a citation from Göschel that Hegel accepts). Third: the

sentence that Hegel, in summarizing Malebranche, attributes to Augustine concerns the origin of the Light, and that origin the canon leaves open (*Treatise on the Inner Light*, Grounding); the sentence is neither support nor objection. Fourth: Hegel's critique of medieval Christendom is that of a declared Lutheran, from within, and does not serve as a weapon from outside.

4.4 Vedanta

Hegel's most extensive published text on India is the 1827 review of Humboldt's essay on the *Bhagavad-Gita*, written on the basis of Colebrooke, Jones, Wilford and Anquetil-Duperron. It scarcely pronounces "Vedanta". It sums up that, by this means, "the particular soul becomes God", and judges that Brahma "is unity only as abstract universality, as substance without determination". This "pure being", for not having been carried "to the determination of infinite subjectivity", yields "Indian pantheism". In the review, he names neither Śaṅkara nor the *tat tvam asi*. But in reporting on Sāṃkhya in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, he records "many souls" and calls the union of soul and nature "a great thought".

Wilhelm Halbfass wrote the reference study on the European reception of India (*India and Europe*, 1988 [V via secondary source]); Aakash Singh Rathore and Rimina Mohapatra put, in *Hegel's India* (2017 [V via secondary source]), the fascination alongside the disqualifications. The Advaitin reply says that Brahman is *sat-cit-ānanda* — being, consciousness, bliss —, not empty [paraphrase; location to be confirmed].

Study IV called Vedanta the closest relative of the canon's light: the *ātman* that is neither born nor dies (*Katha Up.* II.18–19) is the most direct echo of the inner light, and to reveal, not to fabricate, is the gesture of both. It parted over participation versus identity — in Advaita, *tat tvam asi*; for Lumen Fluens, each light is unique — and over real history: the river has banks, it is not a veil (*māyā*).

Hegel shows where the border falls: the "particular soul" that "becomes God" is the identity where the sheet drew participation versus identity; "infinite subjectivity" supplies the criterion; and Sāṃkhya shows a plural India that the "pantheism" stamp flattens. But he hinders, because he repeats the "abstract" and that stamp, and because he criticizes a second-hand Vedanta, without Śaṅkara, which is not the sheet's. Two verbal neighbors, already seen in 3.3: the Brahmin's prayer to the sun and the Persian "religion of light". They use the word light; the study takes them neither as support nor as objection, because the canon does not decide which light, in other houses, is the Light.

4.5 Existentialism

On the existentialists Hegel says nothing: he died in 1831, and here the others speak; what he wrote serves as a target. The closest, in his text, is the beautiful soul of the *Phenomenology* (§658; see 1.6

and 3.4), which flees contact with reality in order to keep the purity of the heart; and, in the Preface, "The True is the whole" (§20; see 1.4) [the study's reading].

Kierkegaard, through Johannes Climacus, grants the logical system and denies that of existence: "a) a logical system can be given; b) but no system of existence can be given" (*Postscript*, 1846). In a note, he denies the bridge that Hegel himself makes with Heraclitus and holds as "illusory" what is said in Hegel of process and becoming (see 2.2). Through Anti-Climacus, he portrays the thinker who builds an immense palace and lives in the barn next door (*Sygdommen til Døden*, 1849), without naming Hegel; the tradition reads him there. Sartre accepts "Hegel's brilliant intuition" of making the self depend on the other, but rejects the standpoint of the Whole, "impossible in principle" (*Being and Nothingness*, 1943 [V via secondary source]). Heidegger censures being conceived as the indeterminate immediate and "posited by the subject that determines and conceives" ("Hegel und die Griechen", 1958 [V via secondary source]).

Study V met the existentialists against life lived by roles — Sartre's bad faith, Heidegger's "the they" —, in the Compass as authenticity and in Kierkegaard, the bridge. It parted over invention versus revelation — for Sartre existence precedes essence; for Lumen Fluens, the light precedes lived existence — and over absurdity versus belonging.

For the study, the existentialists are partial allies. The palace and the barn say, through Kierkegaard, what integrity asks; and the objection to the standpoint of the Whole finds an echo, in the study's reading, in the canon, for which "the light is personal, never individual", without the river being denied. But Sartre rejects the *Mitsein* (according to Alves [V via secondary source]), opposed to the Common Waters and the Shelter; and the becoming that this study sees Hegel affirm (see 2.2) is, for Kierkegaard, illusory: the reader should know that the controversy exists. The beautiful soul, finally, recalls a warning the canon had already given itself [the study's reading]: "a philosophy that only protects its own light becomes a museum lamp" (see 3.4).

4.6 Taoism

Hegel treats China as the "religion of measure" and the "empire of duration". He discards, however, the prejudice that lasting is worth more than passing: "the imperishable mountains are no more excellent than the rose that swiftly sheds its petals in its life that fades away in fragrance" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*). Of the religion of the Tao he says that it is linked to "no morality properly speaking, no immanent rationality, by which man would have worth, dignity in itself" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Part II); on the same page he uses *Aberglaube*, superstition, in a tone the series does not adopt. In the *History of Philosophy*: "the highest, the ultimate, the original [...] is nothingness, the void, the wholly indeterminate [...]; it is also called Tao, reason"; "if philosophizing has not gone beyond such expressions, then it stands on the first step".

Here too Hegel depended on second-hand sources: the translation of the *Daodejing* that he saw in Vienna, and Rémusat, for whom *Tao* would mean *lógos* in Greek. Kwok Kui Wong maintains that Hegel stands in the Socratic tradition of definition (*Bestimmung*), whereas Laozi proposes knowing by letting the meaning of things appear by itself; the low judgment would come from Hegel's developmentalist view (2011 [V via secondary source]). Mario Wenning recalls that, in the late lectures on religion, Hegel values Daoism as speculative reason with mystical elements (2017 [V via secondary source]).

Study VI called Taoism water as teacher: *wu wei* (*Tao Te Ching* 8) is kin to carrying, and the necessary useless would give the sabbath of the flow Zhuangzi's blessing. It parted over impersonal versus personal — the Tao is unnamable, and in the river someone remains (for the believer, the Light has a proper name, by confessional independence) — and over spontaneity versus rule.

Hegel brings two gifts. That lasting is not worth more than passing is an unexpected ally for Mutatio; and his criterion, "worth, dignity in itself", draws the border of the sheet, impersonal versus personal, in reverse: the same line, the opposite use. He draws from it a rank in the order of religions; the sheet, a limit between neighboring houses. Two obstacles: he treats the Tao as "abstraction" and "nothingness", and the water of chapter 8 of the *Tao Te Ching* is image, not concept; and his tone cannot be adopted. Of Zhuangzi, from whom Study VI took the necessary useless, Hegel says nothing in the volumes consulted.

4.7 The pattern

Looked at together, the visits repeat one gesture. In the Eastern houses Hegel reaches the highest, the original, declares it indeterminate and sees in the indeterminate nothingness or abstraction. In Buddhism, "nothingness and non-being is the ultimate and the highest"; in Brahma, "substance without determination"; in the Tao, "nothingness, the void, the wholly indeterminate". One recognizes the echo of the beginning of the *Science of Logic*, where pure being, without any determination, is the same as nothing (see 1.2 and 2.2) [the study's reading]. But the gesture brings a return. The moderns' "God cannot be known" is, he says, "only a milder expression" of "God is nothingness"; when Europeans say "God is the supreme being", the determination is "equally abstract and poor"; and the same accusation falls on Greeks and moderns. Hegel returns to European agnosticism the accusation he levels at the East. Whether this gesture reaches a nameless light is question (h), opened in 3.3.

The study follows Hegel in the question, not in the labels. Hegel's question — what is the *Individuum*, the person, worth in itself? — is a neighbor to the question of the series. The labels — "nothingness", "annihilation", "pantheism", "abstract", and the tone of *Verachtung* and *Aberglaube* — belong to whoever put them there and stay in quotation marks, with an owner. Rank is not inherited: Hegel ranks because his answer is a path; the series visits houses because its answer is a

light. There is one demand of his that the series takes seriously: to see in the religions something that is “not merely meaningless, irrational”.

The round through the six houses is done. What remains is to look ahead, to the authors who are to come.

5. Previews: authors to come

Note. The seven sketches in this chapter are not studies. They are placeholders: each author may be visited, should the series reach them, in their best form, and only then will the borders be marked. Here we indicate only where Hegel opens the door and what Lumen Fluens will have to put to the test when the door opens. The passages cited carry their location, and whatever has not been entirely checked carries a verification marker; a hypothesis is called a hypothesis; and the study's open questions, (a)–(l), remain declared, without varnish. The doctrine does not move here: only the founder moves it.

5.1 Kierkegaard

Hegel says that "the True is the whole" (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, Preface, §20; see 1.4) [the study's translation]. **The tradition reads**, through the voice of Kierkegaard (under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus), the limit of the system: "a) a logical system can be given; b) but no system of existence can be given" (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, 1846; a sentence already seen in 4.5). His thesis: the singular existent does not fit in the system. Faith is paradox, not mediation, "precisely this paradox: that the Singular is higher than the Universal" (*Fear and Trembling*, 1843; *den Enkelte er høiere end det Almene*). And to will the good for a reward is duplicity, since "to will one thing is, therefore, to will the good without regard for the reward" (*Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*, 1847). On that page of *Fear and Trembling*, he recalls that Hegel calls the Singular the moral form of evil [paraphrase; location to be confirmed].

The canon answers. It touches the Lux and the Examining at "to will one thing", a bridge that Study V has already named; the Treatise on the Inner Light says: "One strives from the light, not to deserve it." It parts at two points. First, if the Singular is above the Universal, would the Compass, which vetoes the path where the light is not, have to veto Mount Moriah, as *Fear and Trembling* reads it, with Abraham and the raised knife? The question concerns that reading, not the account; the canon does not speak of a "suspension of the ethical", and open question (j) is left for the future study. Second, the "mark of eternity — in every human being" that he sees in the neighbor (*Works of Love*, 1847) is confessional matter: material, not doctrine (see 3.3). For the believer, the Light has a proper name; for the non-believer, it is the deepest conscience; the philosophy does not decide. Elements to test: Lux, Compass, Examining.

5.2 Marx

Hegel says that "individuals are sacrificed and abandoned" and that the Idea pays the tribute of existence "with the passions of the individuals" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Introduction; see 3.2). **The tradition reads**, through Marx, the movement without the mysticism: the dialectic "is

upside down in him. It must be turned over, to discover the rational kernel in the mystical shell" (*Capital*, I, afterword of 1873). His thesis: the human essence "is not an abstraction inherent in the single individual. In its actuality, it is the ensemble of social relations" (*Theses on Feuerbach*, 1845, thesis 6) [page to be confirmed]. Men make history under inherited conditions, and "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (*The Eighteenth Brumaire*, 1852). The critique ends in an imperative: to overthrow the relations in which man is "a debased, subjugated, abandoned, contemptible being" (*Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction*, 1844).

The canon answers. It touches the Flumen at the same fact, that no one starts from zero, with the opposite sign: for Marx the inheritance weighs; for the canon, one gives thanks for it. It touches the Shelter at the "abandoned", for *Sis alteri domus* is the answer to whoever has been left alone, and it touches the wolf at the refusal of whatever debases. It draws near to Marx against the human being taken as isolated, whom the Common Waters call "individual": "the individual is defined by what separates him". Marx's *Individuum* is the singular human being; the canon's "individual" is another use of the word (see 1.5). It parts where thesis 6 denies an "inherent" essence: Pillar I affirms an intrinsic worth, and the canon's possible reply, "the light is personal, never individual", has not yet been put to the test. The critique of religion that leads to that imperative the canon, by confessional independence, neither adopts nor contradicts. The future study will have to test the Flumen, the Shelter, the wolf and the Common Waters, and ask, in open question (k): when evil is structural, does the wolf have "someone"? If it does not, one runs the risk of calling night what is wolf, and to confuse them is, says the canon, abdication.

5.3 Nietzsche

Hegel says that "the misfortune, the pain of the world, was the condition, the preparation of the subjective side for the consciousness of the free spirit [...]" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, III, opening; see 3.2) [location to be confirmed]: pain, according to him, has its place in the whole. Beside this sentence the future study will place another, by Nietzsche; the bridge is the study's, not Hegel's or Nietzsche's: "The lack of meaning of suffering, and not suffering, was the curse [...] — and the ascetic ideal offered him a meaning!" (*On the Genealogy of Morals*, III, 28) [page to be confirmed]. His thesis: "Valuing is creating: hear this, you creators!" (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, "Von tausend und Einem Ziele") [page to be confirmed]. And the formula of greatness is "*amor fati*: to want nothing different", not merely to bear "the necessary", "but to love it" (*Ecce Homo*, "Warum ich so klug bin", 10) [page to be confirmed].

The canon answers. It touches the Shelter and the Lux at the star: "Great star! What would your happiness be, if you did not have those whom you illuminate!" (*The Gay Science*, 342) [page to be confirmed], kin to the light that "is not only for seeing — it is for warming". It parts at three points, which the future study will have to face without haste. First, the Lux: if valuing is creating,

is worth given or created? Pillar I affirms worth as "intrinsic, prior to any achievement or circumstance": the light is not lit — it is revealed. Second, the Vigil: the formula asks that one love "the necessary"; the Vigil keeps watch over the night, does not love it, and before the wolf does not even keep watch: it resists. Third, and sharpest, open question (e): if the lack of "meaning" is the curse, how is one to prevent "presence, not victory" from becoming, itself, a new ideal that consoles? The question is fair, and this study leaves it open; whether and when it will be taken up again, the founder decides. Elements to test: Lux, Shelter, Vigil.

5.4 Hannah Arendt

Hegel says that reason has its cunning: "What is called the cunning of reason is the fact that it lets the passions act for it" (*Philosophy of History*, Introduction; see 1.9). **The tradition reads**, through Arendt, the whole gesture: "To think, with Hegel, that truth resides and reveals itself in the temporal process itself is characteristic of all modern historical consciousness" (*Between Past and Future*, 1961, p. 68). Her thesis: to act is to begin something new, and this happens only among many. "Natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of political thought, as distinct from metaphysical thought" (*The Human Condition*, 1958, p. 9). And forgiveness remedies the irreversibility of acting, but it asks for others: "no one can forgive himself [...]; forgiving and promising in solitude or isolation remain without reality" (*The Human Condition*, p. 237).

The canon answers. It touches the Flumen at natality: "no one starts from zero" and every birth as a beginning are poles, not contradiction, and Pillar III, Mutatio, makes the bridge. It touches the Rule of Mercy at the fresh start that forgiveness releases, "one begins again the next day", and the Common Waters at plurality and the common world. Here too there is a false friend: the "reveals itself" of truth in time, in Arendt reading Hegel, is not that of the Lux (see 3.1).

It parts at two fine points. Open question (b): the Rule of Mercy is reflexive ("its address is reflexive", says the Disputatio: it speaks to the one who failed herself), but it is the river that "takes it up again". The hand that takes it up again would be the Shelter [the study's hypothesis, to be decided by the founder]. And open question (c): the image of the wolf suggests malevolent will, and Arendt shows the harm without it, the "fearsome banality of evil, which defies words and thoughts" (*Eichmann in Jerusalem*, ch. XV, end) [page to be confirmed]. But the canon defines the wolf by authorship, "the evil someone inflicts", not by intent: Arendt touches the image, not the definition. The Examining would be the reflection that thoughtlessness dispenses with [the study's hypothesis]. Elements to test: Flumen, Mutatio, Rule of Mercy, Common Waters.

5.5 Levinas

Hegel says that world history, "as the world's court of judgment", judges the spirits of the peoples (*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §340; see 3.2). **The tradition reads**, through Levinas, a mistake: in

that judgment Hegel "saw, mistakenly, its rationalization" (*Totality and Infinity*, English ed., p. 23) [V-en]; and the Other does not fit in negation: "The other is not the negation of the same, as Hegel would like to say" (p. 305) [V-en]. His thesis: ethics precedes ontology. The face of the Other summons before any knowledge. The suffering of the other is useless and unjustifiable, and "the justification of the neighbor's pain is, certainly, the source of all immorality" (*Entre Nous*, "Useless Suffering") [V-pt; page to be confirmed].

The canon answers. It touches the Vigil twice. In the refusal: no thought should justify the pain of the other, and Levinas speaks of Auschwitz, which is wolf, but also of suffering in general, where the night has its place. In the word: Levinas describes "the awakening, beyond knowledge, to insomnia or to vigil (to *Wachen*)", and that awakening comes "from the other [...] who, without interruption, questions the priority of the Same" ("Philosophy and Awakening") [V-pt; page to be confirmed]. The canon's Vigil is to remain in the night: the same word, two movements.

It touches the Shelter at the "home open to the Other — hospitality" (*Totality and Infinity*, p. 172) [V-en], and here Levinas helps: separation, the home, precedes the encounter, which favors the order Lux → Shelter [the study's reading]. It parts at three points. First, the Compass asks "is the light there?" in the first person, and Levinas would begin with the call: this is open question (f), with a question for the founder: is the Vigil born from the call of the Other or from the light of the one who keeps watch? For Levinas, only the first; the canon does not yet say. Then, the asymmetry of the Other as against what the study reads as reciprocity in the Common Waters. Finally, the biblical root, which is material, not doctrine. Elements to test: Vigil, Shelter, Compass.

5.6 Paul Ricoeur

Hegel says that reconciliation "is attained only through the knowledge of the affirmative, in which that negative disappears as subordinate and overcome" (*Philosophy of History*, Introduction; see 1.9 and 3.2). **The tradition reads**, through Ricoeur, in Faessler's synthesis, the limit of that system: "suffering, through the voice of lamentation, is what is excluded from the system" (*Laval théologique et philosophique* 65/3, 2009, p. 225) [V via secondary source]. His thesis: theodicy fails. "For action, evil is, above all, what should not be, but must be combated" (*Evil*, Spanish ed., p. 60) [V-es]; in the face of what is suffered, however, "the question changes: it is no longer 'Why?' but 'Why me?' The practical answer ceases to be sufficient" (p. 62) [V-es], and what is asked for is mourning. Forgiveness, for its part, gives back to the agent the capacity to act with a liberating word: "you are worth more than your acts" (*Memory, History, Forgetting*, Spanish ed., p. 643) [V-es].

The canon answers. It touches the Lux and the Rule of Mercy at "you are worth more than your acts": the worth prior to any achievement and the fresh start, for "failing the rule does not extinguish the light". It touches the Vigil at a neighboring division, which runs along another axis: Ricoeur separates acting, which combats (p. 60), from suffering, which asks for mourning (p. 62),

and the canon separates the night from the wolf by cause. The wolf one resists; the night one keeps watch over; but the wolf is also suffered. It touches the Flumen and the Examining at gratitude, the question of *The Course of Recognition* (Spanish ed., p. 13) [V-es] that 2.4 has already heard: it is the cleanest bridge between Hegelian recognition and the canon, since it links recognition to the Examining and to grateful humility. Ricoeur, incidentally, does not refute the struggle for recognition; the "truces" do not resolve it (p. 276) [V-es]. It parts where he intertwines evil committed and evil suffered, and there lies open question (l): the distinction between night and wolf will have to take in that intertwining or reject it with reasons. And the liberating word is spoken by someone: relation, once again. Elements to test: Lux, Examining, Vigil, Rule of Mercy.

5.7 Martin Buber

Hegel says that self-consciousness "is only as something recognized" (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, IV.A, §178; see 1.5). None of the sources read has Buber commenting on §178; the bridge is the study's. Buber speaks of the same threshold, that of the other without whom the I is not, in another key: "The Thou comes to meet me by grace: it is not found by seeking" (*I and Thou*, 1923, p. 18). "In the beginning is the relation" (*Im Anfang ist die Beziehung*, p. 25); "It is through the Thou that the human being becomes I" (p. 36).

The canon answers. It touches the Shelter: in Buber, "the human being dwells in his love" (p. 22) and the All becomes a "house with a sacred hearth" (p. 118), which is in dialogue with *Sis alteri domus*. It touches the Corpus: the It, without which "the human being cannot live" (p. 43), recalls the "bricks of the temple". It touches the Lux at the first sentence, which has the form of "the light is not lit — it is revealed", said of the other: the Thou is not obtained, it comes.

It parts where the objection is central: "in the beginning is the relation" puts the relation before the I, and the canon puts the Lux before the Shelter. This is open question (a), which the study on Buber will have to face head-on. A mitigation to test: the Lux answers *how much* the person is worth; Buber, *how the I becomes I*; and the Flumen already says that no one starts from zero. It remains unanswered, and declared: can the hidden light be revealed by the gaze of another? Question for the founder: is the Shelter the place where the Thou can come (Buber) or what the Lux already offers before any encounter? The Eternal Thou and grace are confessional material, not doctrine. The Brazilian edition has "sacred land" where the original says *heiligem Herd*, hearth. Elements to test: Lux, Shelter, Corpus.

5.8 Synthesis of the previews

The table sets out, for each author, where the canon touches, where it parts and what the future study will have to test.

AUTHOR	KEY WORK	TOUCHES AT	PARTS AT	ELEMENTS TO TEST
Kierkegaard	*Fear and Trembling*; *Works of Love* (Vozes)	"to will one thing", without reward	the Singular above the Universal (j); confessional root (material)	Lux; Compass; Examining
Marx	*Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*; *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (Boitempo)	inheritance as condition; the "abandoned"	essence as the ensemble of social relations; structural evil (k)	Flumen; Shelter; wolf; Common Waters
Nietzsche	*The Gay Science*; *On the Genealogy of Morals* (Companhia das Letras)	the star and those it illuminates	created worth; *amor fati*; question (e)	Lux; Shelter; Vigil
Arendt	*The Human Condition* (Forense Universitária); *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (Companhia das Letras, 1999†)	natality; forgiveness; common world	"no one can forgive himself" (b); thoughtlessness (c)	Flumen; Mutatio; Rule of Mercy; Common Waters
Levinas	*Entre Nous* (Vozes, 2nd ed., 2005†); *Totality and Infinity* (Edições 70†, from Portugal)	end of theodicy; home open to the Other	the Other before the Same (f); asymmetry	Vigil; Shelter; Compass
Ricoeur	*The Course of Recognition* (Loyola, 2006); *Evil*	gratitude; acting and suffering; "you are worth more than your acts"	evil committed and suffered intertwined (l)	Lux; Examining; Vigil; Rule of Mercy
Buber	*I and Thou* (Centauro, 10th ed., 2006†)	house with a hearth; "dwells in his love"	the relation before the I (a)	Lux; Shelter; Corpus

† edition checked in a catalog or digital archive; the others, to be checked. The editions indicate where to read; the pages cited in the chapter are those of the originals or of the translations listed in the Sources. For *Totality and Infinity* no Brazilian edition was checked: that of Edições 70 is Portuguese and serves only as a pointer.

The previews touch eight of the study's twelve open questions: (a) whether the Lux comes before the Shelter or the relation comes first (Buber); (b) the Rule of Mercy, which is reflexive, faced with "no one can forgive himself" (Arendt); (c) the image of the wolf faced with thoughtlessness (Arendt); (e) "presence, not victory" faced with *On the Genealogy of Morals*, III, 28 (Nietzsche); (f) the Compass and the Vigil faced with the Other first (Levinas); (j) the Compass faced with Mount Moriah (Kierkegaard); (k) the wolf faced with structural evil (Marx); (l) the border between night and wolf faced with evil committed and suffered (Ricoeur). Questions (d), (g), (h) and (i) have no

preview in this chapter. The next chapter gathers the synthesis and the open questions, from (a) to (l).

6. Synthesis, formula and open questions

6.1 What the study found

Hegel enters Lumen Fluens through the river and through the method. We owe him the greatest formulation of the idea that we are heirs and ancestors, and that the language, the laws and the customs into which each person is born are not scenery but the way in which spirit exists (2.1). We owe him the philosophical dignity of becoming, which he received from Heraclitus and carried to the beginning of the *Logic* (2.2). We owe him the name of what happened to the doctrine when the Disputatio declared two gaps and the Vigil came to answer the first and name the second: determinate negation, *Aufheben* — to preserve and to make cease in a single act (2.3). And we owe him the intuition that the person is realized only when open, in a common life, "at home with oneself in one's other", which is Hegel's formula closest to the Shelter and the Common Waters together (2.4). None of this does the canon need to deny; in good part, it already practices it without the name.

But Hegel knocks on two closed doors, and they are the doors that hold up the house. The first is the light. Hegel affirms the infinite worth of man — he "counts because he is a human being" —, and the border does not run between having worth and lacking it. It runs between worth that becomes actual only when it is known and formed, and worth that is given before any journey and is only revealed: actual and known, on one side; revealed, on the other (3.1). In Hegel the journey is where worth is realized; in the canon, where it is seen. The second door is the night. Hegel looked evil in the face, conceded mourning, rejected the holy end and kept guilt in the forum where it belongs; the study acknowledges it. But his theodicy reconciles the thinking spirit with evil, censures whoever tarries in mourning, and reads the pain of the world, in his own words, as "condition" and "preparation". The Vigil does not take that step: it promises presence, not victory; it keeps watch over the night without converting it, and before the wolf it does not keep watch — it resists, and owes justice now, without waiting for the world's court (3.2). Two lesser borders accompany the two greater ones: that of the name, because Hegel grades the religions by what each knows of the worth of the person, and the canon, by confessional independence, leaves the name of the Light to each person (3.3); and that of the hour, because the owl of Minerva comprehends at dusk, and the Compass vetoes when faced with the path, before walking it (3.4).

Facing the houses already visited, Hegel was a partial guide: his question — what is the person worth in herself? — is a neighbor to the question of the series, and his labels ("nothing", "abstract", "pantheism") stay in quotation marks, with an owner (chapter 4). And his reading opened seven doors to authors the series has not yet visited (chapter 5).

6.2 The formula

Hence the formula that the study proposes to the founder, and that only he can adopt: **Lumen Fluens accepts dialectic as a method of doctrinal growth and refuses it as theodicy.** As a method, dialectic is the discovery that a doctrine grows through the objections it takes seriously; the negative it grows from is the failure of a text before an objection. As theodicy, dialectic reads the night from the end; the Vigil reads it from the one who is in it. That the canon's lack was fruitful does not make fruitful the evil the objection described. (Formula adopted by the founder on 17 October 2026; see the Prologue, "The founder's decisions".)

And hence the second question, which the study proposes as the second face of the series. In the six previous studies, we met the traditions in the gestures and parted over a single question: what lies at the bottom of the person? With Hegel, the question unfolds: what lies at the bottom of the night? Hegel answers: a reason with which the thinking spirit can be reconciled. The canon does not describe a bottom of the night; it promises presence, and that "no one shall be without light inside the night". The answer the study proposes, and which the founder confirms or corrects, is this: a light lit inside the night, which does not need the end in order to be worth something. (Question and answer adopted by the founder on 17 October 2026; see the Prologue, "The founder's decisions".)

6.3 Open questions

Honesty is the method, and the study leaves twelve questions that the canon, as it stands, does not answer. None of them is a gap that the study can close: they are matters for the founder, for future treatises or for the studies that chapter 5 announces.

On the person and the other. (a) Does the Lux come before the Shelter, or does the relation come first? The canon presents the light first and the Shelter after; Buber, Mounier and, in another way, Levinas put the thou before the I. The Treatise already says that the gaze of the other does not manufacture the light; whether it can reveal the hidden light, the canon does not say (3.1, 5.7). [Decided by the founder on 17 October 2026: the Lux comes first; the Shelter can reveal a hidden light.] (b) The Rule of Mercy is reflexive — it speaks to the one who failed herself —, but it is the river that "takes it up again"; Arendt reminds us that no one can forgive themselves. Would the hand that takes back be the Shelter? It is the study's hypothesis (5.4). [Decided by the founder on 17 October 2026: the hand that takes back is the river, the Flumen, not the Shelter.]

On evil. (c) The image of the wolf suggests malevolent will, and Arendt showed harm without it; the canon defines the wolf by authorship, not by intent, and the image will have to bear thoughtlessness (5.4). [Decided by the founder on 17 October 2026: it can — the wolf is whoever inflicts, with or without intent; thoughtlessness is not night.] (d) The canon speaks of light and of temple, and Adorno denies to every word "tinged with elevation" the right to remain intact after

Auschwitz; the canon's lexicon is the founder's decision (3.2). [Decided by the founder on 17 October 2026: the lexicon is kept; the objection is recorded as heard.] (e) If, as Nietzsche has it, the curse is the meaninglessness of suffering and not suffering itself, how can "presence, not victory" be kept from becoming, itself, an ideal that consoles? (5.3). (g) The Vigil says that justice is owed in the face of the wolf, and does not say what justice that is, nor how it is distinguished from vengeance; the Disputatio already foresaw that this is matter for a dedicated treatise (3.2, 3.4). (k) When evil is structural — the inheritance that weighs, as Marx says —, does the wolf have "someone"? If it does not, one runs the risk of calling night what is wolf (5.2). (l) Where does the border between night and wolf run when the evil suffered is, in part, committed, as Ricoeur describes the intertwining? (3.2, 5.6).

On the name. (h) The canon leaves the Light nameless, and Hegel hands back to European agnosticism the accusation he levels at the East: the indeterminate would be nothing. Can a nameless light be determined by life — by the practice of the Kindling, the Carrying and the Examining — without being so by the concept? (3.3, 4.7).

On the decision. (f) The Compass asks "is the light there?" in the first person; Levinas would begin with the call of the other. Is the Vigil born from the call of the Other or from the light of the one who keeps watch? (5.5). (i) If the Compass is a veto of fidelity and not a criterion of truth, and the content comes from the Shelter and the Common Waters, is that enough to take away from it the last solitary judge? (3.4). (j) If the Singular stands above the Universal, as *Fear and Trembling* reads it, would the Compass veto Mount Moriah? The question concerns that reading, not the account (5.1).

Of the twelve, four asked for the founder's word — (a), (b), (d) and, as concerns the image, (c) —, and received it on 17 October 2026 (see the Prologue, "The founder's decisions"); two ask for a treatise — (g), which the Disputatio itself commissioned, and (l), which depends on it —; the others await the future studies in which they were born. None puts at risk what the canon already says: the Vigil continues to distinguish the night from the wolf, and the Compass continues to veto. What the questions ask for is more doctrine, not another.

6.4 The lamp

Hegel wrote that the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk, and he was right about the craft of comprehending: one comprehends late. The canon has its own owl, the Examining at the end of the day. But the whole night comes after dusk, and for it the owl is of no use. What serves is the lamp: each one's light, set upon the river and entrusted to the waters of all, which does not promise the dawn, does not pretend it is not night, and does not go out. Hegel knew how to say, as few have, what the river is. What the lamp does inside the night, the canon says on its own: *Lux in tenebris vigilat*.

APPARATUS

Note on this edition

This edition translates the Portuguese original in full (version 1.1, 17 October 2026, with the founder's decisions), including the study's own renderings of Hegel and of the other authors, which were made from the German, English, Spanish and Portuguese editions named in the Portuguese apparatus. Where a passage carries the marker [V-en] or [V-es], it was verified in an English or Spanish edition, but this translation renders the study's Portuguese wording, not that edition's text: a reader working in English or Spanish should prefer the edition cited. Quotations from the Canon v1.2, the Treatises, the Disputatio and the founder's decisions follow the published English text of the Lumen Fluens site. The sources by chapter, the bibliography and the list of pending checks are kept below as in the Portuguese original, because they record the editions and the wording actually consulted; only the verification panel is translated.

Sources cited by chapter, bibliography and pending checks (Portuguese original)

Fontes citadas, por capítulo

CAPÍTULO 1 — HEGEL EM SUA MELHOR FORMA

Convenções. A *Fenomenologia do Espírito* é citada pelos § de Miller (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford, 1977); a numeração por ¶ de Pinkard e Baur (Cambridge University Press, 2018) corresponde a ela [localização a confirmar]. W = *Werke in 20 Bänden* (Suhrkamp, 1969–1971), texto digital que marca as páginas por parágrafo; "ca." = página ±1 (em W12, ±2). Os Adendos (*Zusätze*) e as lições (*Vorlesungen*) são compilações póstumas, de autoridade menor: a *Filosofia da História* vem de Gans (1837) e K. Hegel (1840); a *Filosofia da Religião*, de Marheineke, no vol. I da 1ª ed. (1832) e no vol. II da 2ª ed. (1840), com paginações diferentes entre si e da edição crítica (Jaeschke, Meiner). As traduções para o português são de trabalho, feitas pelo estudo a partir do alemão, e estão por conferir contra as edições brasileiras (Meneses, Müller, Iber e outros); no corpo, a marca [tradução do estudo] aparece na primeira ocorrência.

Hegel diz

- *Fenomenologia do Espírito* (1807), Prefácio §2 (botão, flor, fruto) · W3, ca. 12 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, Prefácio §§17–18 (substância como sujeito; o círculo) · W3, ca. 22–23 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, Prefácio §19 (a seriedade do negativo) e §20 ("o verdadeiro é o todo"; o absoluto como resultado) · W3, ca. 23–24 · [V]; [paráfrase] para a ideia que decai em edificação, glosa do alemão do §19
- *Fenomenologia*, Prefácio §39 (a moeda cunhada) · W3, ca. 40 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, Introdução §78 (o caminho do desespero) · W3, ca. 72 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, Introdução §79 (a negação determinada) · W3, ca. 73–74 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.A §§178–179 (o reconhecimento) · W3, ca. 145 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.A §§187–188 (a luta de vida e morte; "pessoa"; o *Individuum*) · W3, ca. 148–150 · [V]; [leitura do estudo] para *Individuum* = ser humano singular
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.A §§194–196 (o medo, o trabalho, a vaidade) · W3, ca. 153–155 · [V]; [paráfrase] para a vaidade do fazer sem o medo (§196)
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.B §§198–200 (o estoicismo) · W3, ca. 157–158 · [V]; [paráfrase] para o §199 (época de medo, servidão e formação universais), a partir do alemão
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.B §§202–206 (o ceticismo; a consciência infeliz) · W3, ca. 159–163 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.B §217 (o além) · W3, ca. 169–170 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, V, abertura, §231 (o imutável reconciliado) · W3, ca. 177 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, VI.C.c §658 (a bela alma) · W3, ca. 483–484 · [V]; [paráfrase] para *Entäußerung*, a partir do alemão
- *Fenomenologia*, VI.C.c §§666–667 (o juiz; o coração duro) · W3, ca. 489–490 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, VI.C.c §669 (as feridas do espírito) · W3, ca. 491–492 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, VI.C.c §§670–671 (a palavra da reconciliação; o Sim reconciliador) · W3, ca. 493–494 · [V]

- *Ciência da Lógica*, Livro I, cap. 1 (Ser, Nada, Devir) · W5, 82–83 · [V]
- *Ciência da Lógica*, Livro I, cap. 1, Observação sobre *Aufheben* · W5, 113–114 · [V]; os tradutores vertem a palavra por "suprassumir" ou "superar" [localização a confirmar]
- *Ciência da Lógica*, Doutrina do Conceito, Ideia absoluta (a negação da negação) · W6, 563 · [V]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas*, §18 (a Ideia) · W8, ca. 63 · [V]
- *Enciclopédia*, §§79 e 82 (os três lados do lógico) · W8, ca. 167–180 · [V]
- *Enciclopédia*, §24, Adendo 2 (a liberdade: "estar junto de si em seu outro") · W8, ca. 85 · [V]; [paráfrase] para a frase *Freiheit ist nur da, wo kein Anderes für mich ist, das ich nicht selbst bin*. O substantivo *Beisichselbstsein im Anderen* é fórmula de intérpretes; Hegel escreve o infinitivo *in seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein*.
- *Enciclopédia*, §24, Adendo 3 (a queda) · W8, ca. 90–93 · [V]; [paráfrase] para a subjetividade que só se sabe e só se quer em sua particularidade, com exclusão do universal (*nur sich weiß und will in seiner Besonderheit mit Ausschluß des Allgemeinen*), e para a observação de que as coisas naturais não fazem mal (*die natürlichen Dinge tun nichts Böses*)
- *Enciclopédia*, §244 (a Ideia se solta como natureza) · W8, ca. 392–393 · [V]
- *Enciclopédia*, §381 (o espírito, verdade da natureza) e §385 (o espírito) · [V; página a confirmar]
- *Enciclopédia*, §564, Observação (contra o "inconhecível") · W10, ca. 373 · [V]
- *Enciclopédia*, §573, Observação (o mesmo conteúdo na filosofia e na religião) · [V; página a confirmar]
- *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito* (1821), §7, Adendo (amizade e amor) · W7, ca. 56–57 · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §35, Adendo e §36 ("pessoa") · W7, ca. 94–95 · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §209, Observação ("o homem vale porque é homem") · W7, ca. 360 · [V]; [paráfrase] para a ligação com a *Bildung*
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* (ed. Gans e K. Hegel), Introdução, a razão governa o mundo · W12, ca. 20 · [V]
- *Filosofia da História*, Introdução, a "teodiceia"; o espírito pensante reconciliado · W12, ca. 28 · [V]
- *Filosofia da História*, Introdução, o progresso na consciência da liberdade; um, alguns, todos · W12, ca. 31–32 · [V]
- *Filosofia da História*, Introdução, o "matadouro" (*Schlachtbank*); a tristeza e a objeção a comprazer-se nela · W12, ca. 34–36 · [V]; "taciturna" para *trübselig* é tradução de trabalho, a conferir contra as edições brasileiras (UnB; Centauro), pois a palavra diz também "sombrio, melancólico"
- *Filosofia da História*, Introdução, a astúcia da razão · W12, ca. 49 · [V]
- *Filosofia da História*, o homem como fim em si e de valor infinito · W12, ca. 403–404 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke), 1832, I, p. 80 (representação e conceito) · [V]
- *Filosofia da Religião*, 1832, I, índice (a ordem das religiões determinadas) · [V; página a confirmar]; [ordem de 1832; cursos posteriores a confirmar]: o budismo vem antes do hinduísmo, e cursos posteriores invertem
- *Filosofia da Religião*, 1840, II, pp. 264–265 (o conhecimento como fonte do mal; fonte da reconciliação) · [V]
- *Filosofia da Religião*, 1840, II, pp. 300–301 ("Deus morreu"; a inversão; "apenas a morte da morte") · W17, 290–291 segundo Gabriel, *Aurora* 23/33, 2011 · [V]; dois excertos do mesmo passo, e o trecho omitido entre eles diverge entre as testemunhas (*Aufgeben/Aufheben*)
- *Filosofia da Religião*, W16, ca. 86 ("esta é a religião cristã"; o espírito percorre seu caminho na religião) · [V]; [paráfrase; localização a confirmar] para a observação sobre "percurso" (*Bahn*) e "escada"

A tradição lê

- Chalybäus (1837), origem da fórmula "tese–antítese–síntese" · [fonte secundária; localização a confirmar]
- Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge University Press, 1975); ed. bras. *Hegel: sistema, método e estrutura* (É Realizações, 2014; tradutor a confirmar) · leitura metafísica do espírito; citado como leitura, sem página

- Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge University Press, 1994) · leitura social; citado como leitura, sem página
- Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge University Press, 1989) · leitura pós-kantiana; citado como leitura, sem página
- Alexandre Kojève, *Introdução à leitura de Hegel* (Contraponto/EdUERJ, 2002; orig. 1947) · leitura antropológica de senhor e servo, influente e contestada; citado como leitura, nunca como "Hegel diz"
- Jean Hyppolite, *Gênese e estrutura da Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel* (Discurso Editorial, 2003; orig. 1946) · contrapeso a Kojève, útil para a consciência infeliz e a bela alma; citado como leitura, sem página

O cânon responde

- Águas Comuns (cânon, v1.2) · "o indivíduo define-se pelo que o separa; a pessoa, pelo que a abre" · base do aviso de vocabulário em 1.5

CAPÍTULO 2 — ONDE NOS TOCAMOS

Convenções. W = Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–1971); "ca." = página ±1 (em W12, ±2). A *Fenomenologia do Espírito* é citada pelos § de Miller. As *Lições* e os Adendos são compilações póstumas (Gans, Marheineke, Michelet), de autoridade menor que as obras que Hegel publicou. SKS = *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*. As traduções para o português entre aspas são de trabalho, do estudo [tradução do estudo], e devem ser conferidas contra as traduções brasileiras de referência: *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, trad. Paulo Meneses (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1992); *Ciência da Lógica*, trad. Christian Iber e outros (Petrópolis: Vozes, 2016–2018; dados da edição a conferir); *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito*, trad. Marcos Lutz Müller (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2022). Marcadores: [V], passagem conferida no texto ou em edição de referência; [V-es], conferida em tradução espanhola, na página dessa edição; [paráfrase], o estudo resume, sem aspas, o que o texto diz; [página a confirmar], a passagem existe e falta a referência exata.

Hegel diz

- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, Prefácio · §§17–18 (W3, ca. 22–23) · [V]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, Prefácio · §19 (W3, ca. 23–24) · [V]; "decai em edificação": [paráfrase]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, Introdução · §79 (W3, ca. 73–74) · [V]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, IV.A · §178 (W3, ca. 145) · [V]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, IV.B · §217 (W3, ca. 169–170) · [V]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, V, abertura · §231 (W3, ca. 177) · [V]
- *Ciência da Lógica*, Livro I, cap. 1, Ser–Nada–Devir · W5, 82–83 · [V]
- *Ciência da Lógica*, Livro I, cap. 1, Observação sobre o *Aufheben* · W5, 113–114 · [V]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas* · §18 (W8, ca. 63); §244 (W8, ca. 392–393) · [V]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas* · §§79–82, com o §81, *das eigene Sichaufheben* (W8, ca. 167–180) · [V]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas* · §24, Adendo 2 (W8, ca. 85) · [V]; que a liberdade só existe onde não há outro para mim que eu mesmo não seja ("Freiheit ist nur da, wo kein Anderes für mich ist, das ich nicht selbst bin"): [paráfrase]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas* · §385, a tripartição do espírito (exposição do sistema em 1.1, sem citação literal) · [V]

- *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito* (1821; forma curta, *Filosofia do Direito*) · §7, Adendo (W7, ca. 56–57); §36 (W7, ca. 94–95) · [V]
- *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito* · §209, Observação (W7, ca. 360) · [V]; a ligação do valor do homem com a formação (*Bildung*): [paráfrase]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* · Introdução (W12, ca. 31–32) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* · o homem como fim em si e de valor infinito (W12, ca. 403–404; a passagem está em 1.8) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* · a cristandade e o túmulo vazio (W12, ca. 470–471) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* · Parte III (W17, ca. 187 e 192) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · Introdução, "Wir Lutheraner…" (W18, ca. 93) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · Introdução, o valor do ser humano singular (W18, ca. 140; a passagem está em 3.3) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · Heráclito; o rio como dito de Platão (W18, ca. 319–320 e 323) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · os estoicos (W19, ca. 262 e 265; ca. 285, "a grandeza desse princípio") · [V]

A tradição lê

- Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) · o espírito como realidade metafísica; caracterização da leitura, sem página. Edição brasileira de consulta: *Hegel: sistema, método e estrutura* (É Realizações, 2014)
- Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) · o espírito como sociabilidade da razão; caracterização da leitura, sem página
- Jean Wahl, *Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel*, 2ª ed. (Paris: PUF, 1951) · a consciência infeliz lida como a cristandade medieval · [página a confirmar]
- Jean Hyppolite, *Gênese e estrutura da Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel* (São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2003; orig. 1946) · a mesma leitura · [página a confirmar]
- Søren Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus), *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift* (1846), em português *Pós-escrito conclusivo não científico às Migalhas filosóficas* · nota, SKS 7, p. 280 (orig. p. 232) · [V]. Edição brasileira de consulta: trad. Álvaro Valls (Petrópolis: Vozes, 2013–2016) · [página a confirmar]
- Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", em Amy Gutmann (org.), *Multiculturalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) · pp. 25 e 50 · [V]; a p. 25 é tese do próprio Taylor, e só a p. 50 fala de Hegel
- Axel Honneth, *Kampf um Anerkennung* (1992); edição espanhola, a das páginas: *La lucha por el reconocimiento*, trad. M. Ballestero (Barcelona: Crítica, 1997) · p. 158 · [V-es]; as três formas de reconhecimento (amor, direito, valorização social): [paráfrase]. Edição brasileira de consulta, não conferida: *Luta por reconhecimento* (Editora 34, 2003)
- Paul Ricoeur, *Parcours de la reconnaissance* (2004); edição espanhola, a das páginas: *Caminos del reconocimiento*, trad. A. Neira (México: FCE, 2006) · p. 13 · [V-es]. Edição brasileira de consulta, não conferida: *Percurso do reconhecimento* (Loyola, 2006)

O cânon responde

- Cânon v1.2, citado pelo nome do elemento, sem página · Pilar I (Lux), Pilar II (Flumen), Pilar III (Mutatio) e Pilar IV (Corpus), com a virtude e a prática de cada um; Origem ("luz interior atemporal"; as duas imagens, o templo e a dança); Abrigo; Águas Comuns; Vigília; Regra de Vida (o Examinar); Regra da Misericórdia; Bússola, Independência confessional
- Tratado da Luz Interior · Heráclito e o princípio racional comum; Tomás de Aquino

- Disputatio "A luz interior é compatível com a experiência do mal?" · as objeções, as duas lacunas e a nota da edição
- Fora do cânon, mas da série: Estudo II, Estoicismo · o rio como herança comum (Marco Aurélio, *Meditações* IV.43) e "cidadela interior, não; casa de portas abertas"

CAPÍTULO 3 — ONDE NOS SEPARAMOS (3.1 E 3.2)

Seções 3.1 e 3.2. Convenções. W = Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden* (Suhrkamp, 1969–1971), texto digital que marca as páginas por parágrafo; "ca." = página ±1 (±2 em W12). A *Fenomenologia do Espírito* é citada pelos § de Miller (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford, 1977). Os Adendos (*Zusätze*) e as lições (*Vorlesungen*) são compilações póstumas, de autoridade menor: a *Filosofia da História* vem de Gans (1837) e K. Hegel (1840; 3ª ed., 1848); a *Filosofia da Religião*, de Marheineke, tem paginação própria em cada edição (1ª ed., 1832; 2ª ed., 1840) e difere da edição crítica (Jaeschke, Meiner): as páginas de 3.2 são do vol. II da 2ª ed. (1840). A *Filosofia do Direito* é a obra de 1821 (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*; em português, *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito*, na tradução de Müller). As traduções para o português são de trabalho, feitas pelo estudo a partir do original ou da edição indicada no marcador, e estão por conferir contra as edições brasileiras; [V-en], [V-es] e [V-pt] dizem a língua da edição de onde vem a página impressa conferida. No corpo, a marca [tradução do estudo] aparece na primeira ocorrência.

Hegel diz

3.1

- *Fenomenologia do Espírito* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807), Prefácio §20 (o absoluto como "resultado") · W3, ca. 23–24 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.A §178 (a autoconsciência "só é como algo reconhecido") · W3, ca. 145 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.A §187 (a "pessoa" e a verdade do ser-reconhecido; contexto, §188) · W3, ca. 148–150 · [V]; o *Individuum* como ser humano singular · [leitura do estudo]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas*, §24, Adendo 2 (a liberdade só existe onde nenhum outro é para mim que eu mesmo não seja: *Freiheit ist nur da, wo kein Anderes für mich ist, das ich nicht selbst bin*) · W8, ca. 85 · [paráfrase]
- *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito* (1821), §35, Adendo ("pessoa": o "mais alto" e o "algo desprezível") · W7, ca. 94–95 · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §124, texto e Observação (a série das ações; o direito da liberdade subjetiva, "enunciado no cristianismo") · [V]; o *Wende- und Mittelpunkt* entre a Antiguidade e a modernidade · [paráfrase]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §139 (o sujeito singular tem, sem restrição, a culpa de seu mal) · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §209, Observação ("o homem vale porque é homem") · W7, ca. 360 · [V]; a ligação do valer com a *Bildung* · [paráfrase]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*), Introdução (um, alguns, todos; "nós sabemos que todos os homens em si [...] são livres") · W12, ca. 31–32 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, o homem como fim em si e de valor infinito · W12, ca. 403–404 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*), III ("Um espírito que não é manifesto não é espírito"; *offenbar*) · W17, ca. 187 e 192 · [V]

3.2

- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, Introdução, a "teodiceia"; o espírito pensante reconciliado com o *Böse* · W12, ca. 28 · [V]; o texto de Gans e K. Hegel (ed. de 1848, Duncker & Humblot; Reclam, 1924) dá *Bösen*, e a variante *mit dem Negativen versöhnt*, que circula, não se confirmou
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, Introdução, o parágrafo da *Schlachtbank* (a tristeza a que nenhum resultado faz contrapeso; o comprazer-se, *trübselig*, nas "sublimidades vazias e infecundas") · W12, ca. 34–36 · [V]; "taciturna" para *trübselig* é tradução de trabalho, a conferir na edição UnB ou na Centauro, pois a palavra diz também "sombrio, melancólico"
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, o perecer como obra "nicht nur ein Werk der Natur, sondern des Willens der Menschen" · W12, ca. 34–35 · [V] no alemão; no corpo, em [paráfrase]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, a história que não é o solo da felicidade; a felicidade entregue ao reino da contingência · W12, ca. 42 · [paráfrase]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, a figura histórico-mundial e a "flor inocente"; a censura moral · W12, ca. 48–49 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, a astúcia da razão: os indivíduos "sacrificados e abandonados" · W12, ca. 49 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, a ressalva *Selbstzweck* ("algo neles mesmos eterno e divino") · W12, ca. 50–51 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, fecho do livro (a renúncia a "descrever mais de perto o interesse de seu destino em dor e alegria") · ed. 1848, pp. 546–547; W12, ca. 540 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke), 1840, II, pp. 264–266 (a queda: "a fonte do mal" e "a reconciliação tem sua última fonte", p. 265; a cisão no conceito do espírito, p. 266) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião*, 1840, II, pp. 300–301 ("Deus morreu"; "a dor mais alta"; "Mas o curso não fica aqui, sobrevém a inversão"; "apenas a morte da morte") · W17, 290–291 segundo Gabriel, *Aurora* 23/33, 2011 · [V]; dois excertos do mesmo passo, e o trecho omitido entre eles diverge entre as testemunhas (*Aufgeben/Aufheben*)
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião*, III, abertura · 1840, II, p. 192 ("a condição, a preparação do lado subjetivo para a consciência do espírito livre") · [V; localização a confirmar]; o ano do curso em que Hegel disse a frase está por conferir, e a mesma frase está em W17, ca. 187, com outra paginação
- *Glauben und Wissen* (*Fé e Saber*, 1802), fecho (a "Sexta-feira Santa especulativa"; a totalidade suprema que "pode e deve ressurgir"; a dor infinita "como momento") · *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* II.1; GW 4, ca. 413–414 [a confirmar] · [V; localização a confirmar]; texto conferido na edição Meiner (via Projekt Gutenberg-DE); as páginas de W2 (ca. 432) e da ed. Tolle (Hedra, 2009, p. 173) só vêm de fonte secundária
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, Prefácio §20 ("o verdadeiro é o todo", que Adorno inverte) · W3, ca. 23–24 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, Prefácio §32 (o demorar-se junto do negativo; "a força mágica") · W3, ca. 36 · [V]; a "morte" como *Unwirklichkeit* do separado · [paráfrase]
- *Fenomenologia*, VI.C.c §669 (as feridas do espírito) · W3, ca. 491–492 · [V]; §670 (a palavra da reconciliação) · W3, ca. 493–494 · [V]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas*, §375 ("sua doença originária e o germe inato da morte") · [V]; Adendo ao §376 (da casca morta sai o espírito) · [paráfrase]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, Prefácio (a reconciliação como conhecimento; "o desespero frio") · W7, ca. 25–27 · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §139 (a culpa do sujeito singular, "sem restrição") e §140, Observação ("o fim santo") · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §219 (o caso individual cabe ao tribunal) · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §§340 e 342 (o tribunal do mundo; "não é o mero juízo de seu poder") · W7, ca. 502–503 · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §345 (a justiça "imperfeita"; a história universal "cai fora") · [V]
- *Filosofia do Direito*, §347 (*rechtlos*) · [V]; §350 (*Heroenrecht*) e §351 ("bárbaros", direito desigual) · [paráfrase]

A tradição lê

3.1

- Taylor, Charles, "The Politics of Recognition", em A. Gutmann (org.), *Multiculturalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25, 41, 50 · [V]; a p. 25 é tese do próprio Taylor, e só a p. 50 lê Hegel
- Honneth, Axel, *La lucha por el reconocimiento*, trad. M. Ballestero (Barcelona: Crítica, 1997; orig. *Kampf um Anerkennung*, 1992), p. 114 · [V-es]; as três formas de reconhecimento (amor, direito, estima social; a terceira, ligada a capacidades reconhecidas como valiosas, p. 158) · [paráfrase], com rótulos do estudo. Ed. bras. de consulta: *Luta por reconhecimento* (São Paulo: Ed. 34, 2003)
- Scheler, Max, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1916), pp. 386 (n. 1) e 524 · [V]; *Person der Personen, d. i. Gottes* (p. 524) · [paráfrase]
- Mounier, Emmanuel, *Personalism*, trad. P. Mairet (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 20 · [V-en]
- Maritain, Jacques, *The Person and the Common Good*, trad. J. J. Fitzgerald (New York: Scribner's, 1947), cap. III · [V-en; página a confirmar]
- Buber, Martin, *Ich und Du* (Leipzig: Insel, 1923), pp. 18 e 25 · [V]. Ed. bras. de consulta: *Eu e Tu* (Centauro), sem paginação conferida
- Levinas, Emmanuel, *Totality and Infinity*, trad. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), pp. 172 e 305 · [V-en]. A ed. portuguesa (*Totalidade e infinito*, Edições 70) é pt-PT e serve só como indicador
- Ricoeur, Paul, *La memoria, la historia, el olvido*, trad. A. Neira (Madrid: Trotta, 2003), p. 643 · [V-es]
- Scheler, Mounier, Maritain, Buber e Levinas entram como material filosófico; suas raízes confessionais não são adotadas
- A hipótese do estudo (Lux = dignidade; reconhecimento = identidade e visibilidade) e a leitura de Honneth que a acompanha · proposta do estudo; não é texto de Taylor, de Honneth, de Hegel nem do cânon

3.2

- Adorno, Theodor W., *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), pp. 352, 356, 358 · [V]; p. 29 ("a necessidade de dar voz ao sofrimento") · [V via secundária: Kirchhoff, 2018, em espanhol; português do estudo, alemão não conferido]. Ed. bras. de consulta: *Dialética negativa*, trad. M. A. Casanova (Zahar); as páginas citadas são da ed. alemã
- Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (1951), §29 e §33, trad. inglesa de D. Redmond · [V-en]; o alemão (GS 4) não foi conferido; a aporia entre vingar e poupar · [paráfrase]
- Benjamin, Walter, Tese IX (1940), em *Magia e técnica, arte e política*, trad. S. P. Rouanet (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 7ª ed., 1994), p. 226 · [V via secundária]; a tese não nomeia Hegel, e a leitura contra a *Filosofia da História* é de intérpretes
- Levinas, Emmanuel, "O sofrimento inútil", em *Entre nós: ensaios sobre a alteridade* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 2ª ed., 2005), ca. p. 138 · [V-pt; página a confirmar]
- Ricoeur, Paul, *El mal: un desafío a la filosofía y a la teología*, trad. I. Agoff (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 2006), pp. 60, 62 · [V-es]; o entrelaçamento do mal cometido e do padecido · [V via secundária]: Faessler, em *Laval théologique et philosophique* 65/3 (2009), p. 225, resumindo Ricoeur, "Le mal : un défi à la philosophie et à la théologie"
- Metz, Johann Baptist, "Theologie als Theodizee?", em Oelmüller (org.), *Theodizee: Gott vor Gericht?* (München: Fink, 1990), pp. 103–118 · [V via secundária: Rössner]; Neiman, Susan, *Evil in Modern Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) · [localização a confirmar]; o corpo os cita apenas como quem apontou a mesma lacuna
- Balthasar, Hans Urs von, *Mysterium Paschale* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1970) · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]. Material confessional: nomeia um intervalo, não importa doutrina

- Lewis, Alan E., *Between Cross and Resurrection: A Theology of Holy Saturday* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001) · dados editoriais apenas; [conteúdo não lido]; não citado no corpo
- Weil, Simone, "L'amour de Dieu et le malheur", em *Attente de Dieu* (Paris: La Colombe, 1950; ensaio de 1942), conferido na transcrição da Wikisource · [V; página a confirmar]; traduções do estudo; não foi localizada edição brasileira integral do ensaio. Texto confessional: material, não doutrina. O fecho sobre Jó ("Alors un jour Dieu vient se montrer lui-même à elle") e o trecho sobre os "criminosos" como "tuiles détachées d'un toit par le vent" são do mesmo ensaio

O cânon responde

3.1

- Pilar I (Lux); Pilar II (Flumen); Tratado da Luz Interior (Definição; Fundamentação; "Objeção provável e resposta breve"); Abrigo; Águas Comuns · pelo nome dos elementos, sem página
- Estudos anteriores da série: ficha do Estudo II

3.2

- Vigília (a noite e o lobo; "presença, não vitória"; "um círculo de claridade"); Bússola; Independência confessional; Disputatio "A luz interior é compatível com a experiência do mal?" (*ad primum*; *respondeo*; *ad secundum* e *ad tertium*, para as duas lacunas; nota da edição); Regra da Misericórdia · pelo nome dos elementos, sem página
- Estudos anteriores da série: ficha do Estudo II

CAPÍTULO 3 — ONDE NOS SEPARAMOS (3.3 E 3.4)

Seções 3.3 e 3.4. As traduções para o português são de trabalho e estão por conferir contra as edições brasileiras; as marcadas [tradução do estudo] no texto são do estudo.

Hegel diz

3.3

- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia*, Introdução · W18, ca. 140 (a régua: *keinen Wert in sich*) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, Introdução · W12, ca. 31–32 (um, alguns, todos) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke, 1832) · I, ca. 244 ss. (China) a 344 ss. (Egito); II, ca. 46, 96, 156 e 191 ss. (a ordem das religiões determinadas) · [V; página a confirmar]; a ordem de 1832 põe o budismo antes do hinduísmo, e cursos posteriores a alteram · [localização a confirmar]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* · W16, ca. 86 (o espírito percorre seu caminho na religião; "escada" é acréscimo dos intérpretes, não de Hegel) · [V]; "escada" · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas*, §573, Observação (o conteúdo da filosofia e o da religião é o mesmo; ver 1.10) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke, 1832) · I, p. 80 (representação e conceito; ver 1.10) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke, 1832) · I, pp. 329–330 (a "religião da luz"; Pérsia, *Religion des Guten*, que o estudo traduz por religião do Bem) · [V; página a confirmar]
- Resenha de Hegel (1827) ao ensaio de Humboldt sobre o *Bhagavad-Gita* · W11, ca. 202 (prece do brâmane ao sol; o português é tradução do estudo) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião*, II · W16, ca. 374 e 376 ("Deus não pode ser conhecido"; "apenas uma expressão mais branda" de "Deus é o nada") · [V]

3·4

- *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito* (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 1821), Prefácio · W7, ca. 24 e 27–28 ("o que é racional é efetivo"; a filosofia chega "sempre tarde demais"; a coruja de Minerva) · [V]
- *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito*, Prefácio · W7, ca. 25–27 ("a rosa na cruz do presente"; "o desespero frio") · [V]
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas*, §6, Observação (a efetividade enfática e o mal "ao acaso") · W8, ca. 46–47 · [V]; português refeito pelo estudo, a conferir
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, Introdução · W12, ca. 20 (a razão governa o mundo) · [V]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, IV.B, §§198–200 (o estoicismo; "só o conceito da liberdade") · W3, ca. 157–158 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, §200 ("ficou, por isso, em apuros"; "logo começam a entediar") · W3, ca. 157–158 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · W19, ca. 260 (o "rumo retórico e parenético") · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · W19, ca. 269, 272 e 285 (o critério "muito formal"; "o princípio de contradição"; a grandeza do princípio; na ética, o sujeito como última instância, *Gewissen*) · [V]; *Gewissen* · [paráfrase]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, VI.C.c, §658 (a bela alma) · W3, ca. 483–484 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, §§666–667 (o juiz; o coração duro) · W3, ca. 489–490 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História*, Introdução · W12, ca. 34–35 (o matadouro; o perecer como obra da natureza e da vontade dos homens; *Selbstsucht*; a "margem tranquila") · [V]; o perecer como obra da natureza e da vontade dos homens · [paráfrase]

A tradição lê

3·3

- Droit, Roger-Pol, *Le culte du néant. Les philosophes et le Bouddha* (Paris: Seuil, 1997) · [V via secundária; localização a confirmar] (capítulo sobre Hegel e edição brasileira por conferir)
- Santos, Deyve R. M. dos, "Hegel e o budismo como consciência de si mesmo: aspectos de uma crítica", *Revista Dialectus* 2 (4), 2014, pp. 63–77 · [V via secundária]
- Wong, Kwok Kui, "Hegel's criticism of Laozi and its implications", *Philosophy East and West* 61 (1), 2011, pp. 56–79 · [V via secundária]
- Fontes de Hegel (Turner, W16, ca. 383; Rémusat, W18, ca. 145; Colebrooke, W11) · [V]

3·4

- Hadot, Pierre, *Exercícios espirituais e filosofia antiga* (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2014) · [inferência do estudo; página a confirmar]
- Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N., *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 2 vols.) · [localização a confirmar]

O cânon responde

3·3

- Independência confessional (sob a Bússola); Pilar I (Lux); Tratado da Luz Interior (Fundamentação); Regra de Vida (Acender, Portar, Examinar); Antífona (apenas mencionada, nunca explicada).
- Estudos anteriores da série: Princípio da série de Estudos Comparados; fecho das fichas dos Estudos I–VI.

3.4

- Bússola; Abrigo; Águas Comuns (a Margem; retiro e abuso); Vigília (noite e lobo); Regra de Vida (Examinar; revisão do rio); Disputatio sobre a luz interior e a experiência do mal (*ad secundum*).
- Estudos anteriores da série: ficha do Estudo II (cidadela interior, não).

Leituras do estudo (marcadas no texto)

- 3.3: o parentesco entre o "indivíduo" das Águas Comuns e a *ausschließende Einzelheit*; a religião persa da luz como o Bem ainda abstrato e natural, ainda não espírito; a inferência sobre a passagem da representação ao conceito; a questão aberta (h).
- 3.4: o que o Prefácio não diz sobre a decisão de cada um; a passagem da falta de critério à sua forma; a Bússola como veto de fidelidade, não critério de verdade; a verificação das marcas da Margem pelo Examinar; a vizinhança entre a frase de Hegel sobre o perecer e a distinção entre noite e lobo; o Examinar como compreensão ao entardecer; a questão aberta (i).

CAPÍTULO 4 — HEGEL DIANTE DAS CASAS QUE JÁ VISITAMOS

Convenções. W = *Werke in 20 Bänden* (Suhrkamp, 1969–71); "ca." = página ±1; SKS = *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*; a *Fenomenologia do Espírito* vai pelos § da numeração de Miller. As *Lições* são compilações póstumas (*Filosofia da Religião*, W16–17: Marheineke, 1832; *Filosofia da História*, W12: Gans, 1837; *História da Filosofia*, W18–20: Michelet, 1833–36); as páginas de Marheineke citadas por volume (I, II) são aproximadas (±2). A resenha de Humboldt (W11) é texto publicado por Hegel. As traduções para o português são de trabalho, a conferir contra as edições brasileiras. Onde as fontes traziam só o original, o português é do estudo [tradução do estudo]: *Religion des Insichseins*, "religião do ser-em-si" (glosa; W16, ca. 373–390); "o desprezo do indivíduo" (W12, ca. 164–166); "uma diferença entre budismo e lamaísmo" (W16, ca. 383); "grandeza e calma", "apenas a abstrata" e "o negativo se converte em afirmativo" (W17, ca. 112–113); *Hegels rene Tænken*, "puro pensar" (glosa; SKS 7, 510); "não mais um além, um desconhecido" (W17, ca. 187); "é o próprio espírito divino" (W18, ca. 93); "sua autoconsciência no homem" (W10, ca. 373); "um grande pensamento" (W18, ca. 153); "não seja apenas sem sentido, irracional" (W16, ca. 377).

Hegel diz

Abertura

- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke, 1832) · I, ca. 244 ss. (China) a 344 ss. (Egito); II, ca. 46, 96, 156 e 191 ss. (a ordem das religiões) · [V; página a confirmar]; a ordem de 1832 põe o budismo antes do hinduísmo, e cursos posteriores a alteram · [localização a confirmar]

4.1 Budismo

- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião*, Parte II (budismo e lamaísmo, *Religion des Insichseins*) · W16, ca. 373–390; ca. 374 e 376 ("por baixa e pobre que pareça"; "o nada e o não-ser é o último e o mais alto"; "apenas uma expressão mais branda"); ca. 377 (Fo, Buddha e Dalai-Lama numa só figura); ca. 383 (Turner; "uma diferença entre budismo e lamaísmo"); ca. 384 ("esquecimento e compaixão"); ca. 385–386 (o nirvana como aniquilação) · [V]

- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* · W12, ca. 210 e 214 (a "singularidade excludente" do lamaísmo); ca. 164–166 (*Verachtung des Individuums*, no capítulo da China) · [V]

4.2 Estoicismo

- *Fenomenologia do Espírito*, IV.B, §§198–200 (o estoicismo; o §200, sobre o critério da verdade) · W3, ca. 157–158 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* (Sêneca, Epicteto e Antonino; Heráclito e o estoicismo; o critério formal) · W19, ca. 260 ("rumo retórico e parenético"); ca. 262 e 265; ca. 269, 272 e 285 (a grandeza do princípio, ainda que formal) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (a liberdade de quem venera a necessidade) · W17, ca. 112–113 (*Größe, Ruhe*; *nur die abstrakte*; *das Negative in das Affirmative umschlägt*) · [V]

4.3 Cristianismo

- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião*, Parte III · W17, ca. 187 e 192 (*vollendete Religion*; *offenbare*; "Um espírito que não é manifesto não é espírito"; Deus *nicht mehr ein Jenseits, ein Unbekanntes*) · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, §759 (a Encarnação) e §217 (o túmulo, sem nomear as Cruzadas) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* · W12, ca. 470–471 ("no espírito vivo, em vós mesmos"; "no túmulo entre os mortos"; as Cruzadas) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia*, Introdução · W18, ca. 93 (*Wir Lutheraner…*; *ist der göttliche Geist selber*) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* (Hegel, ao resumir Malebranche, atribui a frase a Agostinho; nos volumes consultados, W19–W20, há seis ocorrências de Agostinho, todas marginais) · W20, ca. 197 · [V; localização a confirmar] (o original de Agostinho não foi localizado)
- *Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas*, §564, Observação (citação de Göschel: *sein Selbstbewußtsein im Menschen*) · W10, ca. 373 · [V]

4.4 Vedanta

- Resenha de Hegel (1827) ao ensaio de Humboldt sobre o *Bhagavad-Gita* (fontes: Colebrooke, W. Jones, Wilford, Anquetil-Duperron) · W11, ca. 131–204; ca. 147 ("a alma particular se torne Deus"); ca. 184 e 187 (Brahma como "substância sem determinação"; o "ser supremo" dos europeus); ca. 190 ("subjetividade infinita"; "panteísmo indiano"); ca. 202 (a prece do brâmane ao sol) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · W18, ca. 153 (o Saṃkhya: "muitas almas") · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke, 1832) · I, pp. 329–330 (a *Lichtreligion* persa) · [V; página a confirmar]

4.5 Existencialismo

- *Fenomenologia*, §658 (a bela alma) e Prefácio, §20 ("O verdadeiro é o todo") · W3, ca. 483–484 e ca. 23–24 · [V]

4.6 Taoísmo

- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* ("império da duração", seção W12, ca. 134–174) · W12, ca. 274 ("as montanhas imperecíveis"); ca. 136 e 146 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião*, Parte II (a seção da "religião da medida", W16, ca. 318–330) · W16, ca. 328–329 (o Tao; "valor, dignidade em si"; *Aberglaube*) · [V]
- *Lições sobre a História da Filosofia* · W18, ca. 145–146 (o Tao e "o nada, o vazio, o totalmente indeterminado"; "primeiro degrau"; o *Daodejing* visto em Viena; Rémusat) · [V]

4.7 O padrão

- *Ciência da Lógica*, Livro I, cap. 1 (o ser puro e o nada puro) · W5, 82–83 · [V]

As demais passagens de 4.7 estão listadas sob 4.1 (W16, ca. 374, 376 e 377), 4.4 (W11, ca. 184 e 187) e 4.6 (W18, ca. 145–146).

A tradição lê

4.1 Budismo

- Roger-Pol Droit, *Le culte du néant. Les philosophes et le Bouddha* (Paris: Seuil, 1997) · [V via secundária] (o capítulo sobre Hegel e a edição brasileira ficam a confirmar)
- Deyve R. M. dos Santos, "Hegel e o budismo como consciência de si mesmo: aspectos de uma crítica", *Revista Dialectus* 2 (4), 2014 · pp. 63–77 · [V via secundária]
- Tradição budista (*nibbaña* como extinção da sede, não do ser) · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]

4.2 Estoicismo

- Pierre Hadot, *Exercícios espirituais e filosofia antiga* (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2014) · [inferência do estudo; página a confirmar]

4.3 Cristianismo

- Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus), *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift* (1846; em português, *Pós-escrito conclusivo não científico às Migalhas filosóficas*) · SKS 7, 510 (orig. 432) (a especulação não deve chamar-se cristã; *Hegels rene Tænken*) · [V]; ed. bras. (consulta): trad. Álvaro Valls (Petrópolis: Vozes, 2013–2016) · [página a confirmar]
- Kierkegaard (Anti-Climacus), *Sygdommen til Døden* (1849; em português, *A doença para a morte*, título a conferir) · SKS 11, 211 (orig. 101) (Deus e homem não correm juntos num só, no Sistema) · [V]; o texto não nomeia Hegel (leitura da tradição)
- Karl Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Zollikon-Zürich, 1947), cap. "Hegel" · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]
- Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Apokalypse der deutschen Seele* (1937–39) e *Theodramatik* IV · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]
- Hans Küng, *Menschwerdung Gottes* (Freiburg: Herder, 1970; editora a confirmar) · [paráfrase; V via secundária; localização a confirmar] (por resenha)
- Eberhard Jüngel, *Gott als Geheimnis der Welt* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1977) · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]
- Jean Wahl, *Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel*, 2ª ed. (Paris: PUF, 1951); Jean Hyppolite, *Gênese e estrutura da Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel* (São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2003; orig. 1946) · [fonte secundária; página a confirmar]

4.4 Vedanta

- Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988) · [V via secundária] (o capítulo sobre Hegel fica a confirmar)
- Aakash Singh Rathore e Rimina Mohapatra, *Hegel's India: A Reinterpretation, with Texts* (Nova Délhi: Oxford University Press, 2017) · [V via secundária]
- Resposta advaitina (Brahman como *sat-cit-ānanda*; cf. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.1; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.7) · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]

4.5 Existencialismo

- Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus), *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift* (1846) · SKS 7, 105 (orig. 78) (o sistema lógico e o sistema da existência); SKS 7, 280 (orig. 232), nota (Hegel e Heráclito; processo e devir "ilusório") · [V]
- Kierkegaard (Anti-Climacus), *Sygdommen til Døden* (1849) · SKS 11, 158–159 (orig. 39–40) (o palácio e o celeiro) · [V]; o texto não nomeia Hegel (leitura da tradição)
- Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Être et le néant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943) · pp. 282, 297–298; *Mitsein*, p. 481 · [V via secundária], por Alves (prenome e título a confirmar), *Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica* 13 (1), 2007, pp. 97–109; as páginas divergem em Pizelli (prenome e título a confirmar), *Revista Húmus* 14 (42), 2024, p. 54; ed. bras. (consulta): *O ser e o nada*, trad. Paulo Perdigão (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1997) · [página a confirmar]
- Martin Heidegger, "Hegel und die Griechen" (1958), em *Wegmarken* (GA 9; alemão a confirmar); ed. ing.: *Pathmarks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) · p. 333 · [V via secundária]

4.6 Taoísmo

- Kwok Kui Wong, "Hegel's criticism of Laozi and its implications", *Philosophy East and West* 61 (1), 2011 · pp. 56–79 · [V via secundária]
- Mario Wenning, "Rational Mysticism: Hegel on Magic and China", *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 44 (3), 2017 · pp. 154–174 · [V via secundária]

O cânon responde

Cânon Lumen Fluens, v1.2, e os textos que o desenvolvem:

- Pilar I, Lux · "A luz não se acende — ela se revela." (o "revela-se"); virtude: Integridade ("coerência entre o que se é por dentro e o que se vive por fora") · 4.3, 4.5
- Pilar III, Mutatio · nomeada, sem citação · 4.1, 4.6
- Bússola · "ela apenas veta os que exigiriam apagar a luz para percorrê-los" · 4.2, 4.5
- Independência confessional (sob a Bússola) · "Para quem crê, a Luz tem nome próprio"; "seja qual for o nome que cada um lhe dê" · 4.4, 4.6
- Abrigo · "Uma filosofia que só protege a própria luz vira lamparina de museu." · 4.1, 4.2, 4.5
- Vigília · nomeada, sem citação · 4.2
- Águas Comuns · "a luz é pessoal, nunca individual: o indivíduo define-se pelo que o separa; a pessoa, pelo que a abre" · 4.1, 4.5
- Regra de Vida, Examinar · nomeado, sem citação · 4.2
- *Tratado da Luz Interior*, Fundamentação · Agostinho entre as fontes do Pilar I; a origem da Luz deixada em aberto · 4.3
- Fichas dos Estudos Comparados I–VI (os resumos publicados): I, Budismo; II, Estoicismo; III, Cristianismo; IV, Vedanta; V, Existencialismo; VI, Taoísmo; passagens que as fichas citam e o capítulo repete: *Katha Upaniṣad* II.18–19 (IV); *Tao Te Ching* 8 (VI) · 4.1 a 4.6

CAPÍTULO 5 — PRÉVIAS: AUTORES QUE VIRÃO

Convenções. W = *Werke in 20 Bänden* (Suhrkamp); "ca." = página ±1 (±2 em W12); SKS = *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*; MEW = *Marx-Engels-Werke*; KSA = *Kritische Studienausgabe*, de Nietzsche, cuja paginação não foi conferida. [V]: passagem conferida no texto ou em edição de referência. [V-en], [V-es] e [V-pt] indicam a língua da edição de onde vem a página (inglesa, espanhola, brasileira); a

edição de Levinas pela Edições 70 é pt-PT e serve só como indicador. Nas citações em português de textos estrangeiros, a tradução é de trabalho do estudo e está por conferir contra as edições listadas; nenhuma página impressa brasileira foi conferida. Os títulos em português que não vêm de edição conferida também são de trabalho; o título original vem ao lado.

Hegel diz

- *Fenomenologia do Espírito* (1807), Prefácio, §20 ("o verdadeiro é o todo") · W3, ca. 23–24 · [V]
- *Fenomenologia*, IV.A, §178 (a autoconsciência "só é como algo reconhecido") · W3, ca. 145 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da História* (ed. Gans e K. Hegel), Introdução (a reconciliação "pelo conhecimento do afirmativo") · W12, ca. 28 · [V]
- *Filosofia da História*, Introdução ("os indivíduos são sacrificados e abandonados"; "com as paixões dos indivíduos") · W12, ca. 49 · [V]
- *Filosofia da História*, Introdução (a astúcia da razão) · W12, ca. 49 · [V]
- *Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião* (ed. Marheineke, 1840), Parte III, abertura (a dor do mundo como "a condição, a preparação") · II, p. 192 · [V; localização a confirmar]; o ano do curso em que Hegel disse a frase não foi conferido
- *Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito* (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 1821), §340 (a história universal como "tribunal do mundo") · W7, ca. 502–503 · [V]

A tradição lê

- Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus), *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift* (1846; em português, *Pós-escrito conclusivo não científico às Migalhas filosóficas*) · SKS 7, 105 (orig. 78) ("nenhum sistema da existência") · [V]
- Kierkegaard, *Frygt og Bæven* (1843; em português, *Temor e tremor*) · SKS 4, 149 (o Singular acima do Universal) · [V]; a alusão a Hegel na mesma página (o Singular como forma moral do mal) · [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]
- Kierkegaard, *Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand* (1847) · SKS 8, 151 ("querer uma só coisa") · [V]
- Kierkegaard, *Kjerlighedens Gjerninger* (1847; em português, *As obras do amor*) · SKS 9, 94 (a "marca da eternidade") · [V]
- Marx, *Thesen über Feuerbach* (1845; em português, *Teses sobre Feuerbach*) · tese 6, MEW 3, 6 · [V; página a confirmar]
- Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung* (1844; em português, *Crítica da filosofia do direito de Hegel: Introdução*) · MEW 1, 385 · [V]
- Marx, *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte* (1852; em português, *O 18 de brumário*) · MEW 8, 115 · [V]
- Marx, *Das Kapital* (em português, *O capital*), I, Nachwort (1873) · MEW 23, 27 · [V]
- Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (em português, *Genealogia da moral*) · III, 28 · [V; página a confirmar] (texto: Projekt Gutenberg-DE, grafia antiga)
- Nietzsche, *Ecce homo* · "Warum ich so klug bin", 10 · [V; página a confirmar]
- Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (em português, *A gaia ciência*) · 342 · [V; página a confirmar]
- Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra* (em português, *Assim falou Zaratustra*) · I, "Von tausend und Einem Ziele" · [V; página a confirmar]
- Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (New York: Viking, 1961) · p. 68 · [V]
- Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2ª ed., 1998; paginação de 1958) · pp. 9, 237 · [V]

- Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (New York: Viking, ed. rev. 1964) · cap. XV, fim · [V; página a confirmar]; a passagem está localizada por seção, não por página
- Levinas, *Totality and Infinity* (em português, *Totalidade e infinito*; orig. *Totalité et infini*, 1961), trad. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) · pp. 23, 172, 305 · [V-en]
- Levinas, *Entre nós: ensaios sobre a alteridade* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 2ª ed., 2005) · "A filosofia e o despertar" (ca. p. 124); "O sofrimento inútil" (ca. p. 138) · [V-pt; página a confirmar]
- Ricoeur, *El mal: un desafío a la filosofía y a la teología* (em português, *O mal*; orig. "Le mal : un défi à la philosophie et à la théologie", 1986), trad. I. Agoff (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 2006) · pp. 60, 62 · [V-es]
- Ricoeur, *La memoria, la historia, el olvido* (em português, *A memória, a história, o esquecimento*), trad. A. Neira (Madrid: Trotta, 2003) · p. 643 · [V-es]
- Ricoeur, *Caminos del reconocimiento* (em português, *Percurso do reconhecimento*; orig. *Parcours de la reconnaissance*, 2004), trad. A. Neira (México: FCE, 2006) · pp. 13, 276 · [V-es]
- Faessler (prenome e título do artigo por confirmar), em *Laval théologique et philosophique* 65/3 (2009), resumindo Ricoeur, "Le mal : un défi à la philosophie et à la théologie" · p. 225 · [V via secundária]
- Buber, *Ich und Du* (Leipzig: Insel, 1923) · pp. 18, 22, 25, 36, 43, 118 · [V]; edição brasileira, só de consulta: *Eu e Tu* (Centauro, 10ª ed., 2006), sem paginação conferível

O cânon responde

Cânon Lumen Fluens, v1.2 (agosto de 2026), e os textos que o desenvolvem:

- Pilar I, Lux · "O valor de cada pessoa é intrínseco, anterior a qualquer conquista ou circunstância. A luz não se acende — ela se revela." · 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.7
- Pilar II, Flumen · "Ninguém começa do zero."; virtude: "Humildade grata" · 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.7
- Pilar III, Mutatio · nomeada, sem citação · 5.4
- Pilar IV, Corpus · os "tijolos do templo" · 5.7
- Bússola · "a luz está lá?"; "ela apenas veta os que exigiriam apagar a luz para percorrê-los" · 5.1, 5.5
- Independência confessional · "Para quem crê, a Luz tem nome próprio [...] Para quem não crê, é a consciência mais funda [...]. A filosofia não decide isso por ninguém" · 5.1, 5.2
- Abrigo · *Sis alteri domus*; "A luz interior não é só para ver — é para aquecer." · 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7
- Vigília · "A Vigília promete presença, não vitória"; "O lobo é o mal que alguém inflige — diante dele não se vela: resiste-se"; "Confundir o lobo com a noite é abdicação" · 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6
- Águas Comuns · "a luz é pessoal, nunca individual: o indivíduo define-se pelo que o separa; a pessoa, pelo que a abre" · 5.2, 5.4, 5.5
- Regra de Vida, Examinar · "Encerrar com gratidão a alguém do passado que tornou o dia possível." · 5.1, 5.4, 5.6
- Regra da Misericórdia · "Falhar na regra não apaga a luz. Recomeça-se no dia seguinte, sem drama. O rio não pune a folha que parou numa margem; ele a retoma." · 5.4, 5.6
- Tratado da Luz Interior, "O problema que responde" · "Esforça-se a partir da luz, não para merecê-la." · 5.1
- Disputatio sobre a luz interior e a experiência do mal, *Respondeo* · "seu endereço é reflexivo" · 5.4
- Estudos anteriores: ficha do Estudo V (Existencialismo) · "Kierkegaard, a ponte: querer uma só coisa" · 5.1

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autores, cidades das casas editoras muito conhecidas e o título inglês da tradução de Miller foram acrescentados onde a pesquisa trazia só o sobrenome ou o nome da casa, e devem ser conferidos. Dados marcados como incertos mantêm a marca. "Ed. bras." e "ed. port." são edições de consulta, salvo quando se diz que a página é delas.

Uma entrada por obra, deduplicada entre os oito capítulos e ordenada: Hegel na ordem do sistema (E.3.1), os demais autores em ordem alfabética (E.3.2 a E.3.5). Tudo o que consta aqui vem de D1–D4 ou das "Fontes citadas" do rascunho; nada foi inferido de fora, com uma exceção declarada: prenomes dos autores, cidades das casas editoras muito conhecidas e o título inglês da tradução de Miller (a pesquisa citam só "Miller, Oxford, 1977") foram acrescentados pelo revisor onde a pesquisa trazem só o sobrenome ou o nome da casa, e devem ser conferidos na compilação final. Dados que a pesquisa marcam como incertos mantêm a marca. "Ed. bras." e "ed. port." são edições de consulta, salvo quando se diz que a página é delas. O formato é "autor, título, local, editora, ano"; trocar pelo padrão do estudo (ABNT ou o da série) na compilação.

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- Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge University Press, 2000): a pesquisa dão Pinkard, 1994.
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- Paulo Meneses, *Para ler a Fenomenologia do Espírito* (Loyola, 1985): **não foi encontrada**; a obra verificada é *Hegel & a Fenomenologia do espírito* (Zahar, 2003).
- Søren Kierkegaard, "Pós-escrito às Migalhas Filosóficas": título abreviado; usar o de D3, *Pós-escrito conclusivo não científico às Migalhas filosóficas*.

OBRAS CONSULTADAS NA PESQUISA E NÃO CITADAS NO TEXTO

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Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, p. 314 (via Korver, *Krisis*, 1983); Levinas, "La souffrance inutile", em *Entre nous* (Grasset, 1991), pp. 115–116 (via Rössner). Nenhuma dessas obras é citada no texto.

Conferências pendentes

O rascunho tem 54 marcas com "confirmar" e 184 marcas diferentes de [V] puro (F.1). Agrupadas por tipo de conferência, para quem for fechar o aparato:

TIPO	O QUE FALTA
Traduções de Hegel para o português	Conferir as traduções dos dossiês ("minhas, a conferir") contra Meneses (PhG), Müller (PR), Iber et al. (WdL) [dados a confirmar] e UnB/Centauro (VPG) [base a confirmar]; Enciclopédia sem edição brasileira indicada; refazer "taciturna" (*trübselig*) e a frase de Enz. §6, Obs.
Marheineke (VR)	Páginas ±2 em I (ca. 244 ss.; 329–330) e II (ca. 46 ss.); ordem de 1832 × cursos posteriores; ano do curso da Parte III (1840, II, p. 192); paginação W17, 290–291 (via Gabriel); colação com Jaeschke (Meiner)
Hegel, pontos soltos	PhG: correspondência Miller × Pinkard/Baur (¶); *Glauben und Wissen*, GW 4, ca. 413–414; W20, ca. 197 (o original de Agostinho); páginas de W para §§124, 139, 140, 219, 345, 347, 350–351, 375, 573, 759 (citados só pelo §)
Páginas ou edições dos autores	Marx, tese 6 (MEW 3, 6); Nietzsche (KSA); Arendt, *Eichmann* (por seção); Levinas, *Entre nós* (páginas inferidas); Weil (transcrição da Wikisource, não o impresso); Adorno, ND p. 29 (via Kirchhoff) e MM (alemão não conferido); Benjamin, p. 226 e o título do ensaio; Sartre (Alves × Pizelli); Heidegger (alemão)
Só resumo, catálogo ou editora	Droit, Santos, Wong, Wenning, Halbfass, Rathore e Mohapatra: ler o capítulo ou a seção sobre Hegel antes de citar além da caracterização; Hadot e Long–Sedley: página e capítulos
Conteúdo não lido ou localização ausente	Lewis (só dados editoriais); Balthasar, Barth, Jüngel (tese e páginas); Neiman; Küng (editora); Chalybäus (a obra)
Dados bibliográficos incompletos	Prenomes e títulos de Alves, Faessler, Gabriel, Kirchhoff, Pizelli, Rössner; tradutor de Taylor, *Hegel* (É Realizações)
Edições brasileiras e portuguesas de consulta	Honneth (Ed. 34, 2003 e 2009), Ricoeur (*Percurso do reconhecimento*, *O mal*), Arendt (três obras), Taylor (Piaget, pt-PT), Zahar (*Dialética negativa*, ano), Vozes (*Pós-escrito*, volumes e páginas; *O ser e o nada*, páginas), Centauro (*Eu e Tu*, sem paginação)
Tradições indianas e budista	*Nibbaña* e *sat-cit-ānanda* [paráfrase; localização a confirmar]; os textos védicos citados (*Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya*) vêm do dossiê sem edição

Verification panel

Count, made on the final Portuguese text, of the bracketed markers that accompany quotations and readings. “Body” is the text of the chapters; “Apparatus” is the sources by chapter. A quotation without a marker was verified in the original (see the Prologue, “How to read this study”). The markers appear in this edition in their English form.

MARKER	TOTAL	BODY	APPARATUS
[V]	158	0	158
[... to be confirmed]	91	20	71
[paraphrase]	52	27	25
[V via secondary source]	46	18	28
[V-es]	26	11	15
[the study's reading]	25	23	2
[paraphrase; location to be confirmed]	22	7	15
[V-en]	19	10	9
[the study's translation]	14	9	5
[V-pt]	8	4	4
[the study's hypothesis]	4	4	0
[content not read]	1	0	1
[the study's inference]	1	1	0

Quotations in quotation marks, by chapter:

CHAPTER	QUOTATIONS
Where we meet, where we part — Comparative Study VII	9
1. Hegel in his best form	79
2. Where we meet	39
3. Where we part	160
4. Hegel facing the houses we have already visited	84
5. Previews: authors to come	82
6. Synthesis, formula and open questions	13

Every quotation in the body was checked, fragment by fragment, against the study's source research and against the Canon, the Treatise on the Inner Light and the Disputatio; none was invented.

Those that could not be checked in the original carry a marker. The translations from the German are working translations, still to be checked against the Brazilian reference editions; the Portuguese apparatus lists what remains to be checked.